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ABSTRACT
There is significant complexity in digital forensics due to the numerous device
types and device implementations. This complexity is exacerbated by the need for
digital evidence to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying
technical backgrounds.
This study showed the utility of using software engineering Unified Modeling
Language (UML) modeling techniques for addressing this complexity. Extensible,
executable models for the digital forensics domain were developed depicting the
relevant computational mechanisms involved in the who, what, when, where and how
attributes of digital evidence creation.
Artifacts generated from the executable models enable a systematic
constructive methodology utilizing the principle of abstraction and pattern discovery
to provide a top-down view of the commonalities across implementations. It was
demonstrated that the abstracted, top-down view was equivalent to implementation
specific detailed views. In addition, it was shown that the executable model artifacts
could be used by software applications to illustrate the creation of digital forensic
evidence at various levels of detail.
Lastly, a profile was constructed to extend UML with digital forensic domain
relevant concepts and vocabulary to help enable forensic domain stakeholders, who
may not have a software engineering background, to apply modeling to digital
forensics. The UML profile and the defined constructive methodology provided
concrete artifacts to assist others in the future to develop digital forensic models.
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CHAPTER 1
1

INTRODUCTION
There is significant complexity in digital forensics. Digital forensic analysis is

performed on devices which are complicated systems that contain a large number of
components between which can exist a practically uncountable number of interactions.
Devices can be composed of different component types and component
implementations. In addition, there could be multiple devices involved in a digital
forensic scenario. This complexity is exacerbated by the fact that digital evidence
needs to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying technical
backgrounds.
This problem space is analogous to the development and maintenance of
software systems. Software systems can be incredibly complex, consisting of software
applications and components that can have multiple implementations and practically
uncountable interactions. Like forensic digital devices, software systems also have
stakeholders with varying technical backgrounds. Thus, the question becomes: can
software engineering approaches be applied to digital forensics to assist in managing
digital forensic complexities?
In fact, most forensic devices and components are implemented by software.
So, it was reasonable to explore whether modeling techniques used on software
systems would apply to digital forensics.
Models can facilitate the development of views, techniques, and tools, which
can enhance the understandability of evidence in computational devices. Tools
implemented as software applications can utilize models to abstract relevant
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information to support multiple stakeholder viewpoints. Models can be extended to
address both existing and future implementations of the devices and components that
comprise the systems on which digital forensics are performed. Models can facilitate
the discovery of common implementation patterns across different device
implementations. These patterns can be utilized as a means of simplifying domain
complexities that are reflected in abstracted top-level models. The identification of
patterns also facilitates the development of domain-specific model profiles to describe
the system being modeled in the terminology of the domain stakeholders. The model
profile can then be utilized to support future model development by the domain
stakeholder.
The top-level model needs to evolve over time to address additional
implementations as new devices or versions of devices are introduced. The profile
also needs to be extended to address additional forensic use-cases, as required.
This chapter introduces forensic complexities and software engineering
modeling. The problem statement is documented through a discussion of the ways in
which modeling can address digital modeling complexities. Lastly, research
questions, the hypothesis, and objectives are identified.

1.1 Overview forensics
In digital forensics, stakeholders are concerned with understanding the who,
what, where, when, and how attributes of digital evidence. They need to know what
evidence is available and where to look for it. In addition, they need to know, from a
timeline perspective, when the evidence was created and, if possible, who created it.
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Also, to defend the validly of the digital evidence, it is important to know how the
evidence was created and how it could be changed.
To be able to answer these questions, the stakeholders need to have an
understanding of how digital evidence is created on a device to the appropriate level of
abstraction (e.g., detail) for their role (see Table 1-1). To do this, they need to
understand the computational mechanisms, the device’s relevant underlying
component data structures and the operations performed on these data structures. For
example, an analyst needs a deep understanding of the underlying computational
mechanisms of the device to address all aspects of the evidence and to ensure that their
conclusions are defensible. A witness needs to understand how the evidence relates to
a case, but only needs to understand the computational mechanisms of the device to
the level that they have confidence in the validity of the evidence.

Table 1-1. Stakeholders Roles
Stakeholder Role
Level of Understanding Required
Digital Forensic
Analysis
Lawyer/forensic
expert testimony
Juror
Educator
Student
Law Enforcement

Requires expert level understanding of digital forensics to
determine what information is available and how to
recover the information.
Strong level of understanding to convey important
concepts to a lay audience and to defend analyst results.
Understand the concepts to aide decision making. May
have minimal technical background.
Strong level of understanding of the concepts to teach
others.
Learning concepts. Depending on context, may or may not
have strong technical expertise.
Understand concepts to ensure complete and reliable
collection of data. May have minimal technical
background.

Digital forensic investigations tend to be complex in that they can include
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numerous computational device types implemented by multiple components, with
each component potentially having multiple implementations (see Figure 1-1). In the
context of this dissertation, a device is a computer-based system (e.g., computers,
tablets, phones, etc.). Devices are composed of components (e.g., applications,
operating systems, file systems, network connections, etc.). Components may be
implemented in numerous ways (e.g., operating systems (OS) can by Windows, Linux,
MAC, etc.; files systems can be FAT, NTFS, EXT; etc.).

Figure 1-1. Implementations
There is additional complexity in that a device is not static, but rather has
dynamic behavior that is significant in understanding the creation of evidence.
Devices interact with users and other devices, and components within a device interact
with other components. This research focused on the modeling of devices, device
components, and the interactions of the device components.
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1.2 Overview of software engineering models
Software models capture both the static and dynamic (e.g., behavioral) design
aspects of a system. A formal model is computationally rigorous and can be directly
utilized in both the development and runtime aspects of applications. A model
provides an abstraction of the system.
Software modeling has been used for several decades to address software
complexity. The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is the graphical modeling
language that is widely accepted in the software community. UML provides a means
to model both static and dynamic behaviors of the system. UML can address both
software and hardware in systems.
UML provides a formalism such that the model’s graphical depiction is
consistent with an underlying mathematical basis. UML-based models can be
constrained so that they are unambiguous, which allows models to be internally
consistent and executable as a programming language. Through model execution, the
model behavior can be observed and recorded.
UML modeling utilizes principles, such as abstraction, to address complexity.
Abstraction ensures that only the important details necessary for a particular
stakeholder are addressed. In addition, UML can also be used to identify common
structural and behavior patterns of the system being modeled. This is beneficial since
one representation of an implementation is less complex than having multiple unique
representations of the same underlying device or component functionality.
UML utilizes object oriented terminology and software engineering concepts,
which can be a barrier for individuals without a software background. To address this,
a profile can be created to extend UML to address a domain (i.e., a specified sphere of
5

activity or knowledge). The profile allows for a system to be modeled with concepts
and terminology familiar to a domain stakeholder. As an example, a widely accepted
UML profile for system engineering is the System Modeling Language (SYSML).
SYSML is used by numerous industries (e.g., auto, railway, defense, etc.). This work
explored using UML profiles for the digital forensic domain.

1.3 Problem statement
There is significant complexity in digital forensics due the numerous possible
device types and device implementations. This complexity is exacerbated by the need
for digital evidence to be understood by a wide variety of stakeholders with varying
technical backgrounds.

How does modeling address the problem? Software modeling techniques can
help address the problem of digital forensic complexity by providing an understanding
of the underlying computational mechanisms involved in the creation of evidence,
providing a top-level view that shows that which is common across implementations
and facilitating the development of applications to assist in the understanding of
digital forensic concepts.
Models can be used as a means to formally document the key computational
mechanisms that are involved in digital evidence creation. Models can be shared and
evolved by digital forensic practitioners. Since the model requires specific formal
notations, it allows for non-ambiguous descriptions. The model can also become an
authenticated source to the community. Models need to be extensible so that they can
change overtime. For example the model may need to increase the level of abstraction
6

(i.e., model fidelity) for an analyst stakeholder investigating an aspect of a
computational mechanism. Models are extensible and will be able to address a new
implementations, new forensic categories, new devices, and new evidence creation
use-cases.
Using abstraction to reduce complexity is a concept that is commonly used in
software engineering. Since digital forensics is accomplished on software-based
systems, it is reasonable to assume that this concept is applicable to the digital
forensics domain to manage the complexity of the combinatorically explosive number
of implementation configurations. The premise behind the use of abstraction is that it
is often easier to understand a general concept than to understand all the
implementation details. In addition, common structural and behavioral patterns can be
identified from implementation specific models and used to construct an abstract toplevel model. A top-level model can provide one representation for several
implementations by identifying that which is common across unique implementations
and abstracting out the details.
Applications are regularly available in many fields and domains as a learning
mechanisms. Models can be utilized to facilitate the development and runtime aspects
of applications. Making learning applications more available in the digital forensic
field can only help in facilitating understandability.
Top-level models and digital forensic learning applications can both represent
different levels of abstraction. This potentially allows for the needs of all potential
digital forensic stakeholder to be addressed. Lastly, profiles can more readily make
software modeling techniques available to digital forensic practitioners.
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1.4 Research questions and objectives
The questions to be answered in this study were:
1. Can it be shown that there are commonalities in the device and component
implementations on which digital forensics are based?
2. Is there utility in applying software engineering modeling techniques to
digital forensics in terms of managing complexity and in promoting
understandability?
3. If so, is there a potential approach in applying software modeling
holistically across the digital forensic domain?
The first question was addressed in this work by answering the following question:
 Can implementation commonalty be identified and measured?
The second question was addressed in this work by answering these questions:
 Can models be used to create top-level generalized diagrams?
 Can models facilitate digital forensic learning applications?

The third question was addressed in this work by answering these questions:


How can models be holistically applied to the digital forensics domain?



Can modeling be more accessible to digital forensic stakeholders to reduce
the need of software engineering skill sets?

This work hypothesized that there are commonalities in the implementation of
the components and devices on which digital forensics are performed and that this
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implementation commonality along with software engineering modeling approaches
can be applied to address digital forensic complexities. To address the hypothesis, the
four specific objectives of this study were:


Objective 1: Address domain complexity by utilizing model artifacts to
facilitate the development of applications for learning and analysis that
support multiple digital forensic stakeholder roles.



Objective 2: Address domain complexity by providing a top-down view
and to find commonality patterns across implementations.



Objective 3: Show the extensibility of models to address the introduction
of different implementations and different implementation types.



Objective 4: Construct a digital forensic domain specific UML Profile for
digital evidence creation that can be used for future modeling efforts.

1.5 Contributions of this work
This work identified a unique approach to extend software modeling into the
digital forensic domain by focusing on digital forensic complexities. Numerous
contributions resulted:
1. Modeled the computational mechanisms involved in the creation of digital
forensic evidence,
2. Generated computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a digital
forensic relevant animation application,
3. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of
computational mechanisms,
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4. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational
mechanisms,
5. Identified metrics to support commonality and abstraction analysis, and
6. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile.

By modeling the underlying computational mechanisms, insight and understanding
can be gained on how evidence is created, which would be beneficial to domain
stakeholders. The computational mechanisms were both statically and behaviorally
modeled, and as a result, the model could be executed and model behavior captured.
The captured model behavior can be parsed which allows algorithms to be written to
utilize the captured behavior to facilitate digital forensic applications. In the case of
this work, the captured model artifacts were utilized to generate a script for an
animation application. The animation application could be used as a teaching aide.
Digital forensics tends to be a bottom-up process in that evidence gathering
procedures focus on specific implementations. This work introduces a top-down
approach which utilizes commonalities across implementations. The top-level models
and associated top-down views, are more abstract than the implementation models and
will provide alternate approaches in addressing digital forensics complexities.
Patterns were utilized to identify commonalities across the computational
mechanisms being modeled. The identification of patterns was utilized to determine
the degree of commonality in the different implementations of the computational
mechanisms being modeled. In addition, the patterns can be reused in other modeling
efforts and were also utilized to construct this works top-level models.

10

Commonality and abstraction measures developed for this work provide a
means of quantifying commonality between models and levels of abstraction between
models. These metrics were utilized to assess potential relationships between these
model and implementation properties.
Lastly, this work identified an initial digital forensic for the computational
mechanisms which are the subject of this study. The profile identifies a set of
modeling elements which define the model elements which are relevant to the
vocabulary and concepts of the digital forensic domain. A process on how to extend
the profile was also defined.

11

CHAPTER 2
2

REVIEW OF THE LITERTURE
The validity of digital forensic data can be subject to significant scrutiny, such

as the highly publicized Anthony murder case in which the digital forensics tools
provided contradictory results [1] [2]. There is a critical need to train computer
forensic professionals to properly gather all relevant evidence and to have the staff to
process evidence in a timely manner [3]. The most significant challenge in digital
forensics is the lack of qualified people and recommended the development of new
tools and capabilities [4].
Visualization techniques can be used to enhance learning and understanding.
Visualization has been used in addressing information that might be of interest in
forensic investigations [5]. Visualization has been also specifically used for
understanding of digital forensic information [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11].
UML is often used to facilitate application development as illustrated in [12].
Digital forensics investigations are performed on software-based devices that utilize
standard computer architectures. Therefore, software engineering modeling
techniques are also available to the digital forensics domain.
Models manage complexity by formally capturing both the static and dynamic
design aspects of a system. A formal model is computationally rigorous and can be
directly utilized in both the development and runtime aspects of applications. A
model provides an abstraction of the system. Abstraction removes detail to allow a
higher level view through which to facilitate understanding [13]. Model abstraction
needs to provide the level of detail required to address the generalized attributes that
are of interest, in this case the digital evidence attribute.
12

Patterns in software engineering are utilized to make designs more efficient by
reusing common design approaches [14]. Patterns are documented with artifacts such
as UML class, object, and sequence diagrams. An approach to specify UML patterns
was discussed in [15]. Additionally, [16] discussed pattern types and how patterns can
be utilized in developing domain-specific models.
UML is a widely accepted software modeling approach and is an Object
Management Group (OMG) standard [17]. UML can be used to model both static and
dynamic aspects of software. Model Driven Architecture (MDA) utilizes UML to
support design by providing capabilities such as model execution and model
transformation (e.g., code generation). Models can be executed, similar to code, on
model virtual machines to simulate model behaviors utilizing frameworks that are
based on the OMG Foundational UML [18] and OMG Action Language to
Foundational UML (ALF) standard [19] [20]. An example of an equivalent modeling
framework implementation is eXecutable Translatable UML [21]. Executable models
are of significant importance to this research since they allow the actual behaviors of
the modeled device/device components to be captured and utilized by applications.
UML profiles are a mechanism for extending UML to reflect the terminology
and concepts of a particular domain. UML profiles provide a concise dialect that
consists of stereotypes (i.e., new model meta-elements), tags (e.g., attributes) and
constraints that are support by UML compliant tools [22]. The stereotypes and tags
capture domain terminology/concepts. Object Constraint Language (OCL) rules are
utilized to define the constraints, which are used to provide additional model precision
and can be used for model validation. OCL is an extension of UML [23] that can
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formally specify UML.
Software engineering metrics have been developed for objected oriented
software systems [24]. Examples of software reuse metrics are seen in [25].

Modeling and formalism in digital forensics and cyber security. In addressing
modeling in digital forensics, it is useful to also look at how modeling is used in cyber
security. The cyber security domain is directly related to the digital forensics domain
in that the underling systems to be investigated or analyzed are computer systems that
are based on similar technical concepts at similar levels of abstraction. In the digital
forensic use-case, the analysis is reasoning about the existence of digital forensic
evidence on the computer system, whereas in the cyber security use-case, the focus is
on computer system security vulnerabilities.
Although there are a number of papers devoted to the use of formalism in
digital forensics and cyber security, they have a different focus than the model
proposed from this work. There is a significant amount of literature recommending
the use of modeling in digital forensics to formally model the digital forensic process
[26] [27] [28] [29] [30].
The formalism of modeling can be utilized algorithmically to reason about the
system being modeled. A Turing Machine-Based model to address evidence is
identified in [31]. A modeling method for forensic analysis formally using graphs to
address attack vulnerabilities is discussed in [32]. The use of modeling for the
analysis of evidence in storage media is introduced in [33].
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Garfinkel [34] defined a limited XML schema to formally capture forensic
case information. The intent of the schema was to provide an Application
Programmer Interface (API) for digital forensic tools to share data sets.
The cyber security modeling focus is on identifying system vulnerabilities and
identifying likely attack scenarios [35] [36]. These models incorporated aspects of the
underlying system architecture and in some cases also included a model of the human
element. A method to extend UML to address security concerns has been introduced
in [37].
Another aspect of formalism are Domain Specific Languages (DSL), tailored
programming languages in which domain lexica and concepts are built into the
language. DSLs containing digital forensics and cyber security constructs are to be or
have been developed [38] [39] [40] [41].
Domain Specific Model Languages (DSML) is a model-based approach
analogous to DSLs, but at a higher level of abstraction. DSMLs are targeted for
domain stakeholders and provide an abstract generic model instead of a specific
programming language implementation. Like DSL models, DSML models can also be
directly executed or compiled to provide a transformation to other artifacts utilizing
MDA techniques. UML profiles have a strong relationship to DSMLs and information
between UML profiles and DSMLs can be interchanged [42] and profiles can be used
as a mechanism to design DSMLs [43].
In the cyber security realm utilizing profiles to incorporated security patterns is
discussed in [44]. The utilization of security patterns for development of more cyber
resilient systems is addressed in [45] [46]. Fernandez and Petrie [47] suggested that

15

UML and security patterns can be used as a mechanism to teach secure system design.
An example of the utilization of a pattern in digital forensics to isolate forensically
interesting network data was reported by [48].

Modeling in other domains: System Engineering Modeling Language (SysML). A
significant example of extending UML for other disciplines is seen in the System
Modeling Language (SysML). SysML is a profile extension of UML with a focus on
system engineering of complex systems and system-of-systems through their
lifecycles. SysML has been applied to complex systems in many industries, including
aircraft, automotive, defense, IT, medicine, and space systems. As an example, the
utilization of SysML for auto-embedded systems are discussed in [49] [50]. The
application of SysML for railroad crossings was identified in [51].

Contributions of this study. This study showed the benefits and provided a unique
approach to extend software modeling techniques into the digital forensic domain.
The actual subjects of the model were the computational mechanisms of the software
architecture of evidence creation. The computational mechanisms as defined by this
work were the forensically relevant data structures and control flow as dictated by the
relevant device component(s). In other works for digital forensics, UML was used to
model evidence acquisition, analysis of evidence, and attack methodologies. Other
modeling techniques were utilized to reason on the validity of evidence. These works
did not address the system level constructs of the computational mechanisms. None of
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the UML modeling techniques investigated for this study addressed executable models
nor utilizing the outputs of executable models to be utilized by other applications.
Other works did address utilizing UML to produce animations. However,
these animations were not related to digital forensics. This work utilized the
formalism which UML provides to generate formal artifacts which could be parsed
and animated for a forensic application. This animation provided insight on forensic
applications based on models that can enhance domain understanding.
This work utilized the principle of abstraction along with discovered
commonality patterns to define top-level models from detailed implementations. A
resulting repeatable modeling process on how to construct the abstracted top-level was
identified. An equivalent process was not seen in the literature review.
Patterns are common in object oriented software development. Higher level
patterns have been developed for security design patterns and attack patterns for cyber
security. Although patterns have been addressed for cyber security, they were not
addressed in any of the literature reviewed on digital forensics. The patterns
developed for this work are unique in that they define what is common in the data
structures and control flow of the computational mechanisms which are relevant to
evidence creation.
The other works reviewed during this study identified various types of
software-based metrics. This work extended the metrics of other works to introduce a
new metric for addressing commonality across implementations. In addition a second
new metric was developed to quantify the level of abstraction between top-level
models and models of specific implementations.
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Profiles are a common mechanism to extend UML in other domains, as seen
with SysML. However, the literature search did not identify any digital forensic
related profiles. This work also identifies a process to construct profiles from toplevel views.
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CHAPTER 3
3

METHODOLOGY
This work has two primary focus areas, the construction of top-level models

and profiles, and the development of a learning application utilizing models artifacts.
The first focus area results in the construction of the top-level models to address
digital forensic complexities through abstraction. The top-level models facilitate the
construction of profiles which make modeling more accessible to digital forensic
stakeholders. The second focus area addressed complexities by demonstrating that
modeling could facilitate the development of applications utilized to enhance the
understanding of digital forensic stakeholders.
A combination of expert review, analysis, test, and metrics were used to show that
the objectives were met, see Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Validating the Objectives
Objective
Success Criteria
1: Facilitate Learning and
Analysis Application
1: Facilitate Learning and
Analysis Application
2: Reduced Complexity
2: Reduce Complexity
2: Reduced Complexity
2: Reduced Complexity
3: Extensibility

3: Extensibility
4: DF UML Profile

Validation Method

Model based application has utility for
a user role.
Application provides model
abstractions for multiple user roles.
Common Implementation Patterns
Discovered.
Top-level models developed for a set
of implementations.
Top-level model equivalent to specific
implementation models.
Increased commonality and increased
abstraction shown in metrics.
Repeatable procedure to extend
models for implementation and
implementation types.
Repeatable procedure developed to
extend profiles.
A Profile constructed from models.
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Expert Review.
Expert Review.
Analysis (bottom-up) of
specific models.
Analysis utilizing construction.
Test utilizing transformation.
Metrics.
Analysis utilizing construction.

Analysis utilizing construction.
Analysis utilizing construction

Constructive methods “are heuristics that build up a complete solution from
scratch by sequentially adding components to a partial solution until the solution
is complete” [52]. For this work, a constructive method was utilized to define the
top-level models and profiles. In addition, the constructive method provided the
steps to perform the constructive analysis and test, as identified in Table 3-1. The
constructive method itself was shown to be repeatable and was one of the
outcomes of this work. The constructive method provided a procedure to extend
models and profiles.
Two metrics were used in this work to determine the level of abstraction and to
assess commonality for various steps in the constructive method. The Top-Level
Abstract Metric (TLAM) characterized the reduction of model elements of the
abstracted top-level model with the elements in the implementation specific models.
The Implementation Commonality Metric (ICM) was developed to measure
commonality. The more commonality that existed resulted in fewer types of
components that needed to be taken into account, thus reducing complexity.
Lastly, an application was developed to animate the behavioral script for a
specific model. The animated application demonstrated that a model could be used
directly to generate an application, which could assist the human stakeholder in
understanding digital forensic complexities. This was an example of how models
could facilitate the development of tools/applications to increase human
understandability. The University of Rhode Island (URI) Digital Forensics and Cyber
Security Center (DFCSC) [53] staff evaluated the application.
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This chapter begins by addressing the digital forensic problem space and how it
relates to this work. Next, the constructive methodology is discussed, the forensic
subjects to be modeled are identified, followed by the modeling implementation
approach. The metrics to address commonality and complexity are then introduced.
Lastly, the animated application is described.

3.1 Mapping to the digital forensic problem space
The digital forensic problem space that this work addressed is combinatorically
explosive. There is an uncountable number of digital forensic scenarios that can be
executed on practically an uncountable number of implementations of devices and
device components.
Figure 3-1 displays how this work addressed the problem space. Forensic areas in
the context of this work include media analysis, media management analysis, file
system analysis, application analysis, network analysis, operating system analysis,
executable analysis, image analysis, and video analysis, as originally identified by
[54]. Additional areas that were added over time include RAM (Random Access
Memory), mobile, and database forensics.
Given a forensic area, there are forensic use-cases which identify specific
investigation types. A use-case, in the context of this work, was a set of actions
performed by the suspect on the targeted system or device that would be of interest to
the forensic stakeholder. A use-case scenario was one realization of a use-case which
requires an initial configuration. A forensic attribute was either the evidence or
contributes to evidence identification for the forensic stakeholder.
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This work utilized use-case descriptions to describe a high-level scenario and
the forensic attributes that were of interest for a particular type of forensic evidence
creation. The descriptions were accompanied by an associated use-case diagram that
provided additional details of the activities, the system boundary, and participants
(e.g., actors) in the scenario. The combination of the use-case description and usecase diagram provided the specification for that which was modeled.
The forensic scenario and forensic attributes of what, when, where of the
evidence assist in determining the data structures of the specific implementation. It
should be noted that the forensic attributes may be at a much higher level of
abstraction than the actual implementation of the underlying device or component.
The how of evidence creation is reflected in how the underlying computational data
structures are utilized and how they change during a scenario.

Figure 3-1. Problem Space.

This work focused on developing models for the application, file system, and
RAM analysis areas. The application analysis area was chosen because there is an
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ever-increasing number of application types and implementations. The file system
area was chosen because the file system is utilized by many applications and there
exist a large number of file system implementations. The RAM area was chosen
because it contains key evidence not available through other types of analysis since it
provides insight into the state of the operating system. RAM analysis performs
forensic analysis on what resides in RAM at the time it was captured. The models
created in this project were based on materials utilized in the URI digital forensic
courses and published articles. The specific analysis areas, implementations, and usecases used for this work are shown in Table 3-2.

Table 3-2. Implementations
Analysis Areas Implemen- Implemen- Implementation 1
tation 2
tation 3
Application
Edge
Safari
Chrome
(Browser)
Memory/RAM Windows

Linux

File Systems

NTFS

FAT

Evidence Creation
Use-case
Browsing history,
downloads, cookie
artifacts
Mac (e.g,
Backdoors and remote
macOS,iOS) user access
EXT
File allocation/deletion

3.2 Eight-Step constructive method
The eight steps which comprised the constructive methodology are detailed in
Figure 3-2. In the diagram, the set of steps are shown along with the focus of the step.
In addition, the steps in which metrics were taken are identified. Also shown are the
mapping of the steps to the objectives. The constructive method first specifies what is
to be modeled. There are three use-case scenarios modeled in this work, each
consisting of three implementations. This resulted in the eight-step methodology
being completed three times.
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Figure 3-3 identifies the significant products of the constructive methodology. The
use-case description and use-case diagram specify what is to be modeled. Figure 3-4
provides a graphical representation of the types of modeling artifacts utilized for the
first seven steps of the constructive method.
The specification was used to develop the implementation specific models.
Once developed, the implementation specific models were analyzed for commonalities
from both a black box and white box perspective. From a black box perspective,
common functionality across the implementations was identified as a functional group.
The functional groups were utilized to extend the initial use-case. The resultant
extended use-case described the top-level model. From a white box perspective, the
forensic data structures and scenario control flow were analyzed to determine common
implementation patterns.
The top-level model implements the functional groups and the associated usecase scenario. An analysis was performed to determine which implementation pattern
should be utilized to implement the functional group. The top-level and
implementation models were shown to be equivalent by ensuring that the attributes of
the modeled data structures could be transformed to the forensic attributes.
From the function top-level models, the use-case profile can be defined. The
three use-case profiles constructed from this work were integrated to develop the
holistic digital forensic profile.
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Figure 3-2. Constructive Method.
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Figure 3-3. Constructive Method Concepts

27
Figure 3-4 Detailed Steps 1 thru 7

Model specification (step 1). The first step was to determine the use-cases and usecase descriptions. The use-cases identified the actors, the systems (i.e., devices), the
activities or functions, and components utilized by a suspect for a given scenario. The
high-level functions were typically at the operating system or at the application level
(e.g., Microsoft Word, Chrome browser, command line, etc.). After the use-case and
the associated scenario were determined, the associated forensic attributes were
identified. The use-case description defined a specific usage of the use-case. The
forensic attributes set the model abstraction level.

Develop specific models (step 2). There were three specific model implementations
developed for the use-case. The relevant components (e.g., operating system,
applications) and forensic data structures of the implementation were the focus of the
static model. The operating system and applications were the typical components in
the model along with the forensic data structures. The forensic data structures were
often modeled from tables in forensic documentation or documentation which
described the functionality of interest. The use-case scenario was the basis for the
behavioral model that was developed as a state diagram and utilized action language.
In addition, the initial conditions for each implementation scenario where defined.

Execute models (step 3). The specific models were instrumented so that upon model
execution, an XML script was created. The XML script logged the behavior of the
model during the implementation with respect to the forensic attributes. In the
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specific models, these captured attributes may not have been the exact forensic
attributes, but they could be related to the forensic attributes. For each
implementation, the model behavioral script was verified against the source
documentation to ensure the model implementation exhibited the expected behavior.

Model analysis (step 4). The implementation of specific models were analyzed to
identify common implementation patterns and functional groups. The static
implementation patterns focused on the underlying forensic data structures of the
implementations. The dynamic patterns focused on the control flow of the scenario.
The implementation patterns provide a white box definition of the underlying
computational mechanisms.
The functional groups were the grouping of the common functionality across
the implementations in support of the activities defined in the use-cases. The
functional groups provided a black box definition of the underlying computational
mechanisms. The initial use-case diagrams were extended to incorporate the additional
functionality identified by the functional groupings. Metrics were collected to
identify the common patterns as opposed to the unique model elements in each
implementation.

Develop top-level model (step 5). The top-level model was composed of the
components and the functionality as defined by the functional groupings. Analysis
was needed to determine which common implementation patterns were to be utilized
to model the functional groups in the top-level model. In addition, a determination
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needed to be made about which component provided the control thread. This
component would contain the dynamic behavior that was defined by the state diagram.
Associated Object Action Language (OAL) was created to achieve the desired
behavior of the generation of the forensic attributes for the use-case scenario. Metrics
were taken to quantify commonality across the use-case and to quantify model
abstraction.

Validate top-level model (step 6). Model equivalence showed that the behavior of the
top-level model was equivalent to the behavior of all the specific models for a given
scenario. Figure 3-5 shows conceptually how model equivalence was determined.
The executable models were instrumented such that an XML script was generated,
capturing the behavior of the top-level model and the behavior for each
implementation-specific model with respect to the forensic attributes of the given
scenario.
To verify that the specific implementation models were equivalent to the toplevel model, eXtensible Stylesheet Language (XSLT) transformation rules for each
specific model were developed to map the specific model attributes to the forensic
attributes of the top-level model. It was also verified that the top-level model
behavioral script addressed the forensic attributes utilizing XSLT.
This mapping was analyzed to assess equivalence. If the top-level and specific
models executed the same use-case scenario and each model either directly accounted
for the forensic attributes or could map to the forensic attributes through a
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transformation, it was reasonable to claim that the specific models were equivalent to
the top-level model.

Figure 3-5. Model Equivalence Example
An example of an XSLT transformation is shown in Figure 3-6. The XSTL
rule is used to transform the specific models attribute of clusterSize to the top-level
model’s attribute of dataUnitSize. Also, this attribute was calculated by the equation
bytesPerSector * sectorsPerDataUnit.

Figure 3-6. Example of a FAT XSLT Transformation Rule for sectorsPerDataUnit

As shown in Table 3-3, four transformation rules were identified: direct
mapping, equivalent mapping, intermediate step, and calculation. A direct mapping
31

transformation occurred when there was no difference between the attributes of the
top-level and specific model, of which bytesPerSector attribute is an example. An
equivalent mapping transformation occurred when both specific and top-level models
used the concept without a direct one-to-one mapping, such as time. For example,
time was used in each specific model for the file system category, however, it was
applied differently across the implementation of specific models. An intermediate
step transformation occurred when there were multiple steps to determine an attribute
that was common across the category but was determined differently in each model.
For example, in the file system category, there was a need to determine the target
directory location, but this was done differently for each implementation. A
calculation transformation occurred when the attribute was used in a calculation to
determine a forensic attribute value.

Table 3-3. Types of Transformation Rules
Transformation
Description
Type
Direct Mapping
Attribute of specific model (SM)
is the forensic attribute of the toplevel model (TLM).
Equivalent Mapping
SM attribute is equivalent to
TLM forensic attribute.
Intermediate step
SM attribute is utilized in an
intermediate step to obtain the
TLM forensic attribute.
Calculation
SM attribute is utilized in a
calculations to obtain the TLM
forensic attribute.

Example
bytesPerSector

time
To determine file
location need target
directory
dataUnitSize =
bytesPerSector*Sector
sPerDU

Develop use-case profile (step 7). Use-case profiles for each use-case were developed
from the top-level model of the use-case. The functional grouping implementations
were captured as stereotypes in the profile diagrams. The top-level model data types
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were used to assist in developing the stereotype tags. However, not all top-level data
types were utilized, specifically if they were too detailed or implementation specific.

Develop/integrate DF profile (step 8). The use-case profiles were analyzed to create
one digital forensic profile. Common stereotypes across all the area profiles were then
refactored to ensure that one representation worked across all areas. The area profiles
were adjusted so as to not duplicate the stereotypes which resided in the common
stereotypes. The common stereotypes and the adjusted unique profiles were
combined to create the overall digital forensic profile. Metrics were taken to quantify
commonality across the use-cases.

Constructive Method Contribution. A contribution of this work was the modeling of
the relevant computational mechanisms for evidence creation. How this modeling was
performed is identified by the constructive method. The constructive method itself has
resulted in artifacts and processes which are also contributions of this work. The
artifacts and processes are:
1. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of
computational mechanisms,
2. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational
mechanisms, and
3. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile.

3.3 Model specification: use-cases and use-case descriptions-(step 1)
Three model specifications were defined for the file system create/delete usecase, the browser, browse and download use-case and the RAM list process/network
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connection use-case. For each of these use-cases, a use-case description and use-case
diagram are defined.
3.3.1 File system forensics
The file system implementations were based on [55] and were augmented with
materials from URI forensic coursework. Figure 3-7 depicts the file system
create/delete use-case and Figure 3-8 provides the use-case description that included
the high-level scenario and the associated forensic attributes.
The file system allocation/delete use-case scenario begins when the suspect
“saves” a new file. At some later point in time, the user deletes the file by moving it
to “trash”. The file system use-case was investigating evidence that was created
during file allocation and file deletion. Evidence of interest included information on
the file itself, times, and information, all of which could be used to find evidence, and
file slack, which could be areas in which data can be hidden.
When modeling a use-case, only the functions that are available for all of the
implementations should be included in the use-case scenario to ensure the consistency
of the results in the top-level model. For example, since the journaling capability is
not available in FAT file system, it is not addressed in the file allocation/deletion usecase scenario.
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Figure 3-7. File System Use-Case Diagram

Figure 3-8 File System Use-Case Description

3.3.1.1

File Allocation Table (FAT) file system

The major data structures of the FAT file systems include the boot sector, the
FAT, the directory structure, and the clusters. The boot sector contains the information
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required for the operating system to determine locations of the relevant data structures.
File contents are stored as clusters. The directory is represented as a set of tables
whose entries contain information on a specific file or a subordinate directory. The
FAT table provides information about the clusters in which the file information is
stored.
An example of a file allocation and deallocation in the FAT file system are
shown in Figure 3-9. In this scenario, the file “ root\dir\file1.dat” which is 6000 bytes
is to be allocated to a FAT file system which has a cluster size of 4096 bytes. The FAT
scenario begins when the OS reads values from the Boot Sector to determine cluster
size and the location of key file structures. The OS then reads the root directory to
determine the cluster number of the next directory in the path. Once the target
directory is found the metadata for the file entry in the target directory is inserted.
This includes long file name (LFN) and short file name (SFN), size, timestamps, and
the setting of associated flags. The OS then determines the cluster to be used as the
start cluster for the file. This cluster is written, and if there is more to write, the next
free cluster is determined from the FAT. This process is repeated until there is no
additional file information to write. At this point, the write time is updated.
For file deletion the OS determines the location of the target directory, using
the same process as described above for file allocation. Utilizing the target directory
entry, the target file is located, and the start cluster of the target file is identified.
Utilizing the FAT, the entries in the FAT are marked as “empty”, but the contents
remain. In addition, the file names in the target directory entry are modified, but not
deleted. Times stamps and relevant flags are updated as required.
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Figure 3-9. FAT File Allocation/Deletion. Adapted from [55]

3.3.1.2

New Technology File System (NTFS)

The NTFS major data structures are the Master File Table (MFT) and Clusters.
The MFT entries are composed of attributes, which are themselves complex data
structures. There are MFT entries for directories and files and other data structures
which are of importance to the file system.
An example of a file allocation and deallocation in the NTFS file system is
shown in Figure 3-10. In this scenario the file “ root\dir\file1.dat,” which is 4000
bytes, was to be allocated to an NTFS file system that had a cluster size of 2048 bytes.
The file allocation began when the OS accessed the boot sector to determine cluster
size and the requisite information to process the MFT. In the data attribute within the
associated MFT entry, the allocation of clusters were defined in terms of data runs. A
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data run is a method in defining how an ordered set of clusters can be logically
encoded in bits.
The MFT Entry Bitmap was processed to determine an empty MFT entry.
This entry had the relavant attributes created or updated. The Cluster Bitmap was
used to determine the set of clusters to which the file contents were to be written. The
relevant attributes were updated and then the file content was written.
Next, the target directory in which the file resided was updated. Starting from
the root directory MFT entry, the entry for the target directory entry was determined
by navigating the directory structure. The relevant attributes for the target directory
entry were updated.
File deletion is accomplished by starting with the MFT Entry for the root,
processing the relevant attributes to determine the MFT Entry for the target directory.
From this, the MFT entry for the target file is determined. The target directory is
adjusted to account for the deletion of the file. MFT entry in the Bit Map is processed
to indicate that the clusters are available.
After file deletion, the file contents are still in the clusters and the pointers to
the underlying attributes still exist.
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Figure 3-10. NTFS File Allocation/Deletion. Adapted from [55].

3.3.1.3

Extended (EXT) file system

The implementation details for allocation and deallocation of files in the EXT
file system are shown in Figure 3-11. The major data structure of the EXT files
system are the Super Block, Block Group Descriptor table, Inode tables, Block
Bitmaps, Inode Bitmaps, and Directory contents.
In this scenario, the file “ root\dir\file1.dat,” which was 6000 bytes was to be
allocated to a EXT file system that had a block size of 1024 bytes. The scenario began
when the operating system accessed the superblock to obtain the block size and
structural information. Based on this, the OS was able to process the block that
contained the Root Directory Inode Table and to process the directory path to the
target Block Group and the associated Inode Table. From the Inode table, the block
which contained the target directory contents is determined. The unused space in the
directory for the targeted file was also determined. The Inode for the new entry is
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identified from the Block Groups Inode Bitmap. Utilizing this information, the file
information is entered in the directory structure and the values of the file Inode were
initialized. Utilizing the Block Bitmap, the file contents were written to the blocks.
To perform file deletion, the OS system starts from the root directory and
process the EXT structures in the same way as described above for file allocation to
determine the location of the targeted directory structure. The targeted file elements
are removed from the block containing the directory contents and the file Inode was
deallocated. In addition, the associated entries for the Block Bitmap are deallocated.
At the end of the deallocation process the contents in the blocks still exist.

Figure 3-11. EXT File Allocation/Deletion. Adapted from [55].
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3.3.2 Browser forensics
Numerous sources [56] [57] [58] [59] [60] were utilized for the browser model.
To gain further insight on how to model the browser user-case additional research was
accomplished utilizing the open source database browser for SQLite [61] to analyze
how Chrome stores web information. Browser forensics utilizes numerous artifacts,
including:


History: list of visited URLs.



Cookies: the cookies and associated information from sites visited.



Downloaded files: the metadata for the files that have been downloaded
by the browser.

Figure 3-12 depicts the Browser use-case and Figure 3-13 provides a description of the
use-case, which includes the scenario and the associated forensic attributes. This usecase depicts the scenario in which the suspect is either browsing sites (some with
cookies enabled) or downloading artifacts. In this scenario, the user (i.e., the suspect)
browsed numerous websites, some of which used cookies, and cookies were enabled
on the suspect’s computer. The user also downloaded some documents.
Types of evidence include the URL, title of the webpage, time visited, and the
number of times visited. Since some of the sites use cookies, the cookie names and
cookie values are also available. In addition, the time of cookie creation and access
times are available, as is the cookie expiration times.
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Figure 3-12. Browser Use-Case Diagram

Figure 3-13. Browser Use-Case Description

The underlying information for the browser application was either stored in databases
or files in the file systems. Table 3-4. Browser Configurations provides the names of
the files and databases that were of interest for the browsers and attributes for this
work.
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Table 3-4. Browser Configurations. Adapted from [56] [57] [60].

Chrome

Download
history
cookies

Edge
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Database

Table

History

downloads

History

url

Cookies

cookies

WebCacheV01.dat

CookieEntryEx

WebCacheV01.dat

Containers

WebCacheV01.dat

Containers

History

/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat
/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat
/users/user/AppData/Local/WebCache/WebCacheV0
1.dat

Cookies

/Users/&USER/Library/Cookies/cookies.plist

NSDictionaryCookies

NSDictionaryCookies

downloads

/Users/&USER/Library/Safari/DownLoad.plist

DownLoad.plist

NSDictionaryDL

History

/Users/&USER/Library/Safari/History.plist

History.plist

NSDictionairesHistory

Cookies
downloads

Safari

Path
\users\user\AppData\Local\Google\Chrome\UserData
/Default\databases
/users/user/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/UserData
/Default
/users/user/AppData/Local/Google/Chrome/UserData
/Default

3.3.3 Random Access Memory (RAM) forensics
Ligh, Case, and Walters [62] described Volatility tool suite, a well-known
open-source tool suite for memory forensics. Volatility supports analysis on the
Microsoft Windows, Mac OS X, and Linux operating systems. In addition to the
Volatility sources [62], standard OS textbooks and educational sources [63] [64] [65]
[66] were utilized for the implementation description.
RAM forensics is the analysis of volatile memory in computer systems.
Memory forensics requires a memory image to be captured that provides the state of
RAM at a given point in time. In the case of Volatility, an image is loaded into the
framework that includes commands to retrieve the desired information. This image is
run with a library implemented in Python.
RAM includes the current state of the operating system, executing
applications, and network connections. RAM also provides the internal details of data
structures. Examples of information memory forensics can identify include [67]:


Past and current network connections;



List of running processes at the time of RAM capture;



User names and passwords;



Loaded Dynamically Linked Libraries (DLL);



Open registry keys for a process;



Open files for a process;



Unpacked/decrypted versions of a program; and



Memory resident malware.
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Understanding RAM forensics requires an understanding of the operating
system data structures and algorithms. From a high level of abstraction, the operating
system implementation is described in numerous textbooks which were previously
cited. Typical operating system textbooks segment the operating system into five
categories: Process Management, Memory Management, Virtual Memory, Storage
Management, and I/O.

However, specific information on any implementation, such

as Windows and iOS, are scarce, and the differences between implementation versions
are even less available. To that end, forensic information has only been identified by
researchers who have been able to reverse engineer the operating systems. Open
source operating systems, such as Linux, present a different type of issue. With open
source the source code is likely available, however there is significant work required
to understand the source. The important aspects of the operating system need to be
abstracted so the forensic analyst knows what to look for.
Figure 3-14 depicts the RAM use-case diagram and Figure 3-15 provides the
associated use-case description that identifies the high-level scenario and the forensic
attributes. This use-case was used to track process and network connections
associated with applications. In this use-case there were multiple processes running in
the computer and open network connections. The user (i.e., suspect) hacked into a
target machine. The inspector was trying to determine if malware was installed and/or
if information was being compromised or exfiltrated. Types of information of interest
were the name, process identification, process parents, and times when the processes
were started.
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Figure 3-14. RAM Use-case Diagram

Figure 3-15. RAM Use-case Description
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For this use-case, the focus was on running processes and network
connections. Utilizing RAM forensics enabled the stakeholder to understand the
processes that were being executed on the device. Knowing the processes that were
running provided a forensic analyst information about what applications, and
potentially what activities, were being performed. A forensic analyst could potentially
determine if there were any harmful processes running since the malware processes
were likely to be hidden or disguised.
Knowing about any open connections provided evidence of whether the device
was communicating to the outside or if an outside source had hacked into the device.
IP addresses provided information on the location of the outside source. Knowing
about any open ports provided information on potential vulnerabilities.
Figure 3-16 is a compilation of a generalized high-level operating system
architecture derived from numerous sources [63] [64] [65] [66]. The operating system
architecture in the figure is a very high level abstraction which was used for the
development of the RAM model. Figure 3-15 depicts the relevant operating system
components for the executing application process (e.g., Process). Processes have
virtual memory space in which their stacks and heap reside. Application executables
are loaded into the process memory space. The application has a network connection.
The operating system has a Process Management and I/O Management subsystems.
The Process Management subsystem provides the algorithms that service application
processes. The application has a Handle Table that provides the reference to the
network communication stack (e.g., CommsObj) between the application and the

47

Network Interface Card (NIC). The application communicates over the network
utilizing the Socket API.
The Process List has a reference to all the processes. The Network Connection
List has a reference to all the connections, with each connect having a CommsObj.
There are two types of command line tools. The Process Command Line Tool
provides the list of processes and relevant forensic information for the processes. The
Network Command Line Tool provides a list of connection and the relevant forensic
information associated with the connection.

Figure 3-16. RAM Architectural View
Processes are described by a structure that contains relevant details and
references to other key operating system structures/resources. The process list, which
contains the process structures, can be implemented as a linked list. For example, an
implementation for a Windows 7 system is shown in Figure 3-17. However, based on
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general textbook descriptions it is reasonable to conclude that a link list of processes
could also be utilized to represent Linux and OS.

Figure 3-17. Process List. Adapted from [62].
By analyzing the process list, the forensic analyst is able to determine the
applications that are running and potentially the start times for the applications both of
which could be tied to user activity. In addition, the forensic analyst may want to
inspect for malware. This can be accomplished by:


inspecting for unexpected processes, or



inspecting the parent and child to determine anomalies in how the child
was launched.

The application utilizes the sockets API to interface with the Communication
Object, which represents the network communications of the system. A socket
provides an “endpoint” for sending and/or receiving data. A socket can be accessed
by a process to either receive or send data. The process knows how to address the
socket by accessing the file descriptor in the handle table, which is the implementation
of the OSI-7 layer stack. The network stack contains the network information, such as
IP addresses and ports for the application.
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3.4 Model implementation (steps 2 & 3)
3.4.1 Modeling overview
The UML is a modeling language based on an Object Oriented (OO)
programming approach for software development. UML modeling is equivalent to
programming in most procedural languages, but modeling is at a higher abstraction
level. UML models are often used to provide the overarching software design for
software systems. This design is then utilized to implement the software system in the
more expressive procedural languages. In addition, models, like traditional source
code, can be executed utilizing a model compiler.
UML was derived from previous methodologies in the 1990s under the OMG
standards organization. UML is a visual language based on diagrams. The objective
of UML was to address complexities in software design and architecture. UML
provides a formalism to model structure and behavior to allow for the generation of
various consistent views from a single model representation. Over time, UML has
been extended to address vocabulary and concepts in other domains through profiles.
UML is in a family of modeling standards. Standards are significant in that
they provide the requirements for how the technologies are to be implemented and
ensure that the implementations are consistent. These standards provide a means for
tool and environment vendors to develop products to perform modeling. Standards
also ensure that the modeling constructs are the same across environments, which
allows a consistent utilization of models. The standards are also implemented by tool
vendors or organizations developing open source tools. For example, this work was
implemented utilizing publically available implementations of tool environments.
The two primary environments to support the modeling for this work were eXecutable
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Translatable UML [21] and Papyrus [68]. The model execution utilized xtUML and
the profile development utilized Papyrus.
Papyrus is an open source plug-in to the Eclipse Integrated Development
Environment (IDE). Papyrus fully supports the UML specification and as a result
allows for the modeling of profiles.
The open source environment utilized to develop the executable models was
xtUML, developed by BridgePoint. This modeling environment supports a limited
subset of UML and is a plug-in to the Eclipse IDE. The xtUML environment utilizes
class diagrams, component diagrams, state diagrams, and an action language and
features a model compiler allowing for model execution. In addition, the environment
allows the ability to bridge with applications which are outside of the xtUML
environment, which allows for model instrumentation in which the model behavior
can be captured.

3.4.2 UML diagrams
UML models are created (i.e., programmed) as the UML diagrams are
developed. In programming languages, grammars are used to define the language,
whereas in modeling languages, it is the underlying metamodel which defines the
modeling language. The modeling environment enforces the metamodel rules which
are required to ensure diagram correctness and consistency.
UML consists of fifteen diagrams, seven structural and eight behavior
(depicted in Figure 3-18). Structural diagrams such as the class diagram represent the
entities being modeled and the relationship between the entities in terms of
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associations. Another structured diagram is the object diagram, which shows specific
instances of the classes. Instances are related by links.
An example of a behavioral diagram is the state machine diagram, which
shows the internal behavior of the class. The use-case diagram, another behavioral
diagram, identifies system functions which are contained in the system boundary
along with the actors or stakeholders who utilize the system based on the use-case
functions.
To be valid, a diagram needs to adhere to the UML-specified rules. These
rules ensure that the model representation is consistent across the diagrams.

Figure 3-18. UML Diagrams. Adapted from Visual Paradigm (2019) Retrieved from
https://www.visual-paradigm.com/guide/uml-unified-modeling-language/what-is-uml/

This effort was specifically focused on the class diagrams, state machine
diagrams, use-case diagrams, and, to a lesser extent, object diagrams. In this work,
object diagrams were not developed but their equivalence was realized and viewable
in the modeling environment when the models were executed.
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Class diagram: structural formalism. A class diagram consists of classes and
relationships between classes. A class is a template used to describe objects that
consist of properties or attributes and behaviors defined by methods or operations.
Classes, when instantiated in a program, become objects.
Relationship between classes are shown as associations, which are represented
as lines between classes. Association end points may have role names and
multiplicities. If a role name is not specified, the role name is defaulted to the class
name, in lower case, at the end of the association. The arrow on the association lines
represents how the class diagram is navigated. Navigation shows the sequencing of
how class attributes are to be accessed. Multiplicities are also shown on either end of
an association. Multiplicities indicate the number of instances that result when the
class is instantiated. Multiplicity values are often represented as 0, 1, and ‘*’. A
multiplicity of 0 to any number of elements is denoted by ‘*’ and a multiplicity of 1 to
any number of elements is denoted by 1 ‘*'. Cases in which instantiation results in
multiple objects of the target class result in a collection of objects.
A collection may be a set (e.g., a mathematical set with no duplicate
elements), a bag (e.g., a set which may have duplicate elements), an ordered set (e.g.,
elements ordered by position), or a sequence (e.g., a bag in which elements are
ordered).
Important association types include:


Inheritance (represented as an arrow): provides a subtyping (“is-a”
relationship);
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Composition (represented as a filled in diamond): an association type
between class elements which have a “has-a” or “part-of” relationship;



Aggregation (represented as a diamond): an association type between class
elements which have a “has-a” or “part-of” relationship. This differs from
composition in that the “parts” can exist even if the whole does not;



Dependency Association (represented as a dashed line on an association to
a dependency class): a class which provides attributes on an association.

Figure 3-19 provides an example of a class diagram notation. Class diagrams may
also contain data types, as can be seen in the diagram. Data types are similar to
classes but do not have operations. In this example, class A and class B have attributes
and operations; attributes have types and multiplicities. Attributes which have
multiplicities greater than one can be viewed as a collection. Attributes which are of a
type of a specific class or data type have a dependency on that class or data type. As
an example, the class B attribute attC can have an array of zero or more of KeyValue
data types. Class B inherits from class A resulting in class B having attributes of attS
and attC. There is a composition between with class B and class C. There is a
dependency class, class F, on the association, between class B has and class D. Class E
has a shared aggregation with class G. In addition, both role names and multiplicities
are shown on the associations.
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Figure 3-19. Example Class Diagram Notation

Another example of a class diagram in Papyrus is shown in Figure 3-20. The
DataElementCollection class has a size attribute. In addition the DataElementCollection

class is composed (associated) with the DataElement class with a 1-to-many
relationship. The DataElement class has an id attribute of type Integer and a keyValue
attribute of type KeyValue, which is a data type. The attribute KeyValue data type has a
tuple of key of type Integer and a value attribute of type Inteter.
The diagram describes a collection class of unordered DataElement, with each
DataElement containing a key-value pair. The DataElementCollection class has the

following functions:


addE: to add a key-value pair,



deleteE: to delete a key-value pair.

The DataElement has the following functions:


read: to provide the value for a specific key,



write: to modify the value which is associated with an existing key.
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Figure 3-20. Example Collection Class

Use-case diagrams. A use-case diagram consists of a system of interest,
actors, use-cases and, associations. The system defines the boundaries of the entity
being modeled; in the case of this work, the system is the forensic device of interest.
Actors represent user roles or types of external systems. The system to be modeled
consists of use-cases. A use-case is a set of actions (e.g., activity) which performs a
system function. The actors interact with the system through associations. Two
association types specific to use-cases are include and extend. The include
relationship shows a dependency of one use-case on another use-case and the extend
relationship specifies additional use-case which only occurs during certain scenarios.
In the example shown in Figure 3-21, the actor is the suspect. The system
itself is a device type of Computer. The actor chooses one of the use-cases, Browse
Internet, Save file, or Start application. All these use-cases depended on operating

system use-cases and therefore the extend relationship is used. The Operating System,
the Word Application and the Browser use-cases are grouped as components in the
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Computer. The Browse Internet use-case is, extended by two use-cases, Enable cookies

and Download file. These use-cases occur when the user enables cookies, if required by
the website or if the user downloads a file. In addition, the user may browse to a
website and decide to download a file. These use-cases are contained in the Browser
component. Also depicted in a diagram is a Word Application which has a use-case to
Start application or Save file.

Figure 3-21. Example Use-Case

State machine: dynamic formalism. A state machine is a behavioral model
that consists of a set of states. A state is some condition of the system at a particular
time. The current state can transition to another state given an event. There are
typically two special states, the initial state and the end state.
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Figure 3-22 provides an example of a state machine depicting the state in
which a computer could be from a user perspective. Initially the user logs in. Once
logged into the system, the condition of the system will allow the user to start
interacting with the system. The user may choose to start a browser application to
browse the Internet, or to start an application to work on a document, or they might
choose to install an application. The state machine provides transitions to go back to
the LoggedIn state through which the user may choose another activity or simply log
out. The state machine defines the set of states that may be of interest to a digital
forensic stakeholder. Each of these states may have associated attributes that might
contain evidence.

Figure 3-22. Example State Machine
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3.4.3 Profile extensions for domain representation
A profile is a mechanism to extend UML to add constructs that address domain
vocabulary and concepts. This is accomplished by extending the UML metamodel
with stereotypes. Stereotypes themselves may contain tags that are properties of the
stereotypes. OCL is utilized to further specify the relationships between the domain
specific elements by defining constraints.
The OMG modeling standards define various levels of modeling. To
understand how profiles relate, it is helpful to understand how they relate in the
hierarchy. The OMG model-driven engineering is a development methodology to
create conceptual models in a domain. The OMG Meta Object Facility (MOF) is a
standard for model driven-engineering. The MOF Metadata Architecture is shown in
Table 3-5. This layered architecture consists of four levels. The highest level, M3, is
the most abstract and provides the metamodel for UML. UML is at level M2 and
provides the metamodel rules for the models which are developed in a UML
environment. This is the level of modeling performed in this work. The instantiation
of these models resulted in the actual objects that related to some real world entity.
When the model was executed, instantiations were created consistent with the
scenario; this is at the M0 level.
Table 3-5. Meta Levels. Adapted from [13]
Meta-level
MOF Terms

Example

M3

Meta-metamodel

MOF Model

M2

Metamodel

UML Metamodel

M1

Model

UML Model

M0

Object

Modeled Systems
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This work extended the UML metamodel by identifying a profile that
addressed the digital forensic domain. The models developed in this work were at the
M1 level. In a UML modeling the metamodel, instead of a grammar in traditional
languages, is used to define model semantics.
A domain specific profile was created by extending already predefined UML
elements. More specifically, a profile stereotype extends the meta-class element of the
metamodel. The meta-class could be any of the elements in a UML model (e.g., class,
association, state machine, etc.).
The elements in the metamodel are associated with each other by a class
diagram. A profile does not alter any of the elements of the metamodel (i.e., no
associations are changed) but extends these associations with stereotypes. The
stereotypes themselves define new associations in the profile. These associations may
need additional constraints, which are added using OCL. In addition, the stereotypes
may contain meta-level properties that are identified with tags.
OCL is a declarative language that can add constraints to UML diagrams, such
as class and state diagrams. OCL is utilized to further specify the meanings in the
diagrams to which it is applied. OCL can be viewed in terms of set theory. OCL has a
standard library of primitive types and provides operations for both primitive and userdefined collection types. An OCL expression has a context that is the element for
which the OCL expression is defined. To get to another element, the expression can
have navigation rules to reach another element.
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An example of a profile is displayed in Figure 3-23. The stereotype names
relate to terminology describing components (e.g. OS, File System) which are of
interest to digital forensic stakeholders. In this figure the OS stereotype extends from
both the UML Class and UML StateMachine metamodel element. The FileSystem
stereotype extends the UML Class metamodel-element and OSCall stereotype extends
the UML Association metamodel-element. The OS stereotype has tags of name and
version which are of type string and has an association with the FileSystem stereotype.
The FileSystem stereotype has a clusterSize and name tags, both of type String. There
are two OCL constraints, both having a context of FileSystem. The SizePositive
constraint requires the cluster size to be greater than zero and the NameIsLetters
constraint requires the name of the FileSystem to consist of letters only.

Figure 3-23. Files System Area Profile
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3.4.4 Executable models
Bridgepoint xtUML environment. An executable model is a model that has
run-time behavior. This requires that the behavior of the model be sufficiently
specified. Executable models utilize behavior diagrams such as state or activity
diagrams or an action language for control flow. In order to adequately specify
executable models, additional operational semantics were added to some UML
diagrams using the fUML standard. The textual representation assists in the
development of executable models in cases in which a total graphical representation
could be difficult. The OMG has identified action languages semantics to UML
standard. The action language is model aware in that it can interact with model
elements to enable the execution of the behavior diagrams. The action language for
xtUML is the Object Action Language (OAL).
The modeling environment provided by xtUML is based on Shlaer-Mellor
modeling methodology, which uses a subset of UML notation. This modeling
methodology only utilized a subset of UML diagrams and there are some minor
differences within the constructs of these diagrams that needed to be addressed for this
work. As an example, xtUML state machines do not have specific initial and final
state symbols.
The key elements in the executable model for this work, the class diagrams, the
state machines diagram, and the OAL action language, are depicted in Figure 3-24.
The class diagram is utilized to model the forensic data structures and key components
of interest. The associations between classes are used for navigation by the OAL. The
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state machine diagram is utilized to model the behavior of the system for the scenario
of interest. The OAL provides the constructs to enable the control flow.

Figure 3-24. Model Element Types
An example of a class diagram in xtUML is shown in Figure 3-25. This is the
same diagram shown in the papyrus example (Figure 3-20), with some important
differences. As an example, the xtUML class diagram does not distinguish between
the different types of associations. For this work, the differences between xtUML and
Papyrus did not affect the outcome because they were mostly notational.
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In the example, the OS class has an attribute, osContext, which is a nested data
type of OSData is the type of attribute osContext. Figure 3-26 shows the structure of the
nested data type as modeled.

Figure 3-25. xtUML Class Example
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Figure 3-26. Nested Data Types

OAL is model aware, that is, it is able to interact with the model elements. The
action language provided control flow between classes and allowed access to the class
attributes. As an example of OAL, the operations in the class diagram snippet are
shown in Figure 3-27.
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Figure 3-27. OAL Operation Implementation Examples
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In Figure 3-25, the OS class has an associated state machine symbol. The state
machine (behavior) diagram consists of a set of states and the state transitions (see
Figure 3-28). Each state contains OAL to modify attributes, to make function calls,
and to transition to other states. In the case of the example, the init transition triggers
the state machine. In state X there is OAL code to invoke the functions associated with
the DataElementCollection class after which there is a transition to state Y. The state
machine along with the OAL provide control flow for the model.

Figure 3-28. State Machine Example

Model execution. In this work control flow of the executable model was
defined in the OS or application state machines for a particular scenario. The OS and
applications interacted with the various modeled forensic data structures during
execution.
The model needed to be initialized before it executed. This initialization is
analogous to the instantiation of classes in an object oriented languages or the
equivalent of the object diagram in UML.
In the context of this work, the model configuration was based on the use-case
scenario being model. The model contained a function that initialized the scenario by
instantiating classes and defining links between the instances. To configure the
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scenario, an initialization function needed to be developed. Figure 3-29 shows
a configuration function for the example. This function was manually invoked.
After the configuration function was executed, the instantiated classes
and relationships can be seen in the xtUML display environment, shown in
Figure 3-30. The DataElement instances and the shading of the Init state along
with the instance values were of note.
Next, after being initialized, the start function was invoked. This
function generated an event which triggered the state machine as illustrated
with this OAL snippet:
create event instance evt of OS_A1:init() to OS class;
generate evt;

This trigger event caused the state machine to go through its states and
to execute the OAL in the states to which it transitioned. Figure 3-31 shows
the state machine in its final state, Complete.
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Figure 3-29. Example xtUML Scenario Creation

Figure 3-30. Example Initial State

69

Figure 3-31. Example xtUML Final State

Capturing model behavior. The models were instrumented to record
model behavior. Changes in modeled forensic data structures, state transitions,
and changes in the focus of the thread of control are examples of captured
behavior. A Java application outside of the model recorded these changes in
an XML file (see Figure 3-32).
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Figure 3-32. Capturing Behavior

More specifically, the xtUML environment provided a bridge or external entity object
from which model operations could pass information to an external program. Figure
3-33 provides a snippet showing the definition of an external entity. This external
entity defines two operations, linkData and attributeDataI. The operation linkData
provided information on the entity with the control flow (e.g., the operating system) to
the entity on which it was focused (e.g., forensic data structure). Also provided in
this operation was the “message” that might be passed between the entities. The
attributeDataII operation was used to pass the state of the model data structure attribute

to be recorded in an XML file when it was read or written during the scenario. The
defined operations were invoked from the model (see Figure 3-34). The operation
implementations were static methods in the associated Java application (see Figure
3-35). A snippet of the resulting XML file is shown in Figure 3-36.

Figure 3-33. Example xtUML Bridge

Figure 3-34. Example xtUML External Call
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Figure 3-35. Snippet to Create XML File

Figure 3-36. Sample XML Snippet

73

3.5 Metrics utilized
This work proposes two metrics, the Top-Level Model Abstraction Metric
(TLAM) and the Implementation Commonality Metric (ICM) metric. The TLAM
metric assesses top-level model abstraction. The ICM metric identifies the degree of
commonality within implementations, across implementations in use-cases, and
between use-cases.
This work addressed complexity in a manner similar to that which software
engineering addresses complexity, specifically by utilizing abstraction. The premise
was that a top-level model with fewer elements is less complex and more readily
understandable than a specific implementation model with more elements. A common
implementation pattern is likely to be an abstract view which represents multiple
unique implementation elements. To reduce model complexity, it is advantageous, to
maximize the number of common, abstracted implementation patterns, and minimize
the number of unique elements.

There are two cases of interest to illustrate this

point, comparing the top-level implementation with a specific implementation and
comparing the top-level implementations against all the individual implementations in
a use-case.
Figure 3-37 illustrates the TLAM metric and the two cases of interest. The top
of the figure shows a top-level model with only two elements. The bottom of the
figure shows three functionally equivalent implementations, each composed of unique
elements. The functionality of the implementations is the same as the functionality of
the top-level elements. However, the implementations are different from each other.
In addition, there are less elements top-level elements suggesting that the top-level
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elements are at a higher abstraction level. The TLAM for case 1 is a percentage of toplevel model elements to individual model elements. TLAM is calculated by:

TLAM% = (1-TLME/IME)*100 (equation 1)
where:


TLME is the total number of top-level model elements



IME is the total number of implementation model elements

This perspective identifies the abstraction level of the top-level for a specific
implementation. As an example, if the top-level model represented file system
functions, it could be used to compare the level of abstraction to the NTFS
implementation. In the example in Figure 3-37, it is seen that the elements in the toplevel model result in a 67% reduction of the elements when compared to
implementation 1 (I1), 33% reduction when compared to I2, and a 60% reduction of
elements when compared to I3. The concept is that it is advantageous, less complex,
and easier to understand the fewer abstracted elements of the top-level model versus
the numerous elements in an implementation specific model.
TLAM case 2 compares the top-level implementations against all the
individual implementations in a use-case. This is a ratio of the individual model
elements to the top-level model elements. This perspective identifies the abstraction
level to all implementations across a particular use-case. For example, in the file
system example, this may be comparing the number of elements in the FAT, NTFS,
and EXT implementations for specific functionality. Looking across implementations
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there may be additional increases of abstraction realized in TLAM case 2 since the
top-level model provides an abstraction for multiple implementations vice one
implementation. In the case of the example in the figure, there is a 7:1 reduction. It
should be noted that the smallest ratio, will be N:1, were n is the number of
implementations. This will be the case when all the implementations and top-level
model contain the same number of elements. This will occur when all the
implementations and top-level model are the same.

Figure 3-37. TLAM Illustrated

The ICM metric is analogous to the reuse leverage metric of [69] and the
abstraction metric [70]. The elements that these metrics were measuring are identified
in Table 3-6. This work argues that the ICM is analogous to the reuse metric and
abstraction metric and as a result the ICM metric utilizes a similar calculation. The
values for all the metrics in the table range from 0 to 1 and are non-dimensional. In
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the case of the ICM 0 designates no commonality across implementations and 1
designates 100% commonality across implementations.

Table 3-6. Related Metric Types
Metric
Element Type of Interest
Reuse Leverage
Reused Objects
Abstraction
Implementation
Commonality

Abstracted Classes
Common Patterns

Other Element Types
Built Objects which are not
reused
Concrete Classes
Unique Elements

The Reuse Leverage metric measures the reuse of components across a
software project. The Abstraction metric measures the degree of abstraction across a
package. The Reusability Leverage metric determines the reuse of “objects” in a
software system. The objective is that if there are fewer “objects” to reuse, there are
advantages in the costs of developing and maintaining less “objects”. The abstraction
metric identified the degree to which concepts were abstracted from the details. The
ICM is analogous in that the patterns abstract the details of the unique
implementations. The reuse and abstraction metrics are of the form:
Metric = EoI/TE
where:


EoI are the element types of interest



TE are the total elements in the population

Using this form, the proposed ICM for measuring commonality in a single
implementation or between two implementations can be expressed as:
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ICM = CIS/TIS

(equation 2)

where:


CIS is the total number of common implementation structures (e.g. common
patterns).



TIS is the total number of implementation structures.

An implementation structure is the modeled data structure and may consist of one or
more model elements. The specifics of how CIS and TIS are determined is dependent
on how the ICM is utilized. In each case, it is key to determine the common set of
structures for the entities which commonality is to be determined. Figure 3-38
identifies the three cases in which the ICM metric is utilized. These cases are:


Case 1: Common patterns utilized in a specific implementation.



Case 2: Common patterns utilized across a use case.



Case 3: Common patterns between use-cases.

Figure 3-38. ICM Illustrated
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The application of the ICM equation was as follows:
Case 1 (single implementation). In a single implementation equation 2 was utilized
where:


CIS: the total number of common implementation structures in the
implementation. The CIS patterns need to be previously defined for this
calculation. As an example the common patterns may be those which are
defined for the use-case.



TIS: the total number of implementation structures in the implementation.

The common patterns in which the implementation measured against will need to be
defined.: In the case of the example in the figure, the implementation consists of four
model elements, two of which are identified as common. The resulting metric is 1/2

Case 2 (across a use-case). Across a use-case of multiple implementations, the metric
is calculated, utilizing equation 2, by comparing two implementations at a time. The
metric is the average of applying equation 2, nC2 times, where n is the number of
implementations. More specifically:

ICM = 1/𝑛 ∑𝑚
𝑖=0 CISi/TISi

(equation 3)

where m =nC2
In this context:


CIS: the common implementation structures across the two
implementations.
79



TIS: the total implementation structures between the two implementations.

This metric can also be applied to additional levels of functionality within the
implementations. As an example, in this work, the metric was applied to functional
groups to provide additional granularity.
In the example in the figure, there are three implementations being compared.
When I1 and I2 are compared, C1 is the only common structure between the
implementations. This common structure occurs twice. In addition, there are a total
of ten structures resulting in a metric calculation of 1/5 comparing the two
implementations.

This is repeated for the other two combinations. The average of

these calculations result in a value of 2/5 which defines the ICM for the use-case

Case 3 (comparing two use-cases). Across use-cases equation 2 as utilized where:


CIS: the common implementation structures across the use-cases.



TIS: the total implementation structures in both use-cases.

In the example of the figure, the use-cases have three common patterns, C1, C2, and
C3. These common patterns occur fifteen times. There are a total of thirty elements
which resulted in a metric calculation of ½.

Metric Contributions. A contribution of this work was the identification of metrics to
support commonality and abstraction analysis. This was accomplished with the
establishment of the TLAM and ICM metrics.
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3.6

Animation Application Implementation
A prototype animation application depicting the file creation/deletion scenario

for the FAT file system was created. The application showed the key attributes of
evidence creation for the relevant underlying computational architecture. The
application utilized a script generated by executing a model for the given scenario.
The application provided views to meet the needs of different stakeholder roles.
The animation application read in the behavioral XML script from the FAT
scenario. The application animated the behavioral script. The animation showed the
control flow of the operating system by showing the forensic data structures that were
being read from or written to as the operating system changed states through the
scenario steps. The control flow was depicted by an arrow that indicated the data
structure that was being read or modified.
The architecture for the animation application is shown in Figure 3-39. The
application utilized three XML files that were generated from the model. The
initial.xml file provided the initial settings from the model configuration files. The
detail.xml file populated data structures to provide additional information as required,
and the script.xml file provided the detailed steps.
The animation application consisted of the following functionality: parser, data
structures, animation logic, and the Graphical User Interface (GUI). The parser
extracted the information from the XML files and populated the application data
structures. Based on the user-controlled GUI settings and the parsed script, the
animation logic provided the mechanisms to display the information based on the user
selections and actions to step through the display. The GUI provided the requisite
displays of the animation. The user was able to select various levels of detail to view
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via the GUI. For example, detail information was provide to identify the byte location
and additional descriptive information on the forensic data structures.

Figure 3-39. Visualization Architecture
A demonstration of the prototype animation application was provided to the
URI DFCSC. This demonstration provided a venue for expert review to determine
how closely the application represented the forensic concepts being modeled and to
allow feedback on the potential applicability of modeling to the field of forensics and
stakeholder roles.

Model to Application Contribution. A contribution of this work was to generate
computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a relevant digital forensic
animation application.
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CHAPTER 4
4

FINDINGS
This chapter details the findings of this work. The findings included:


Pattern identification (step 4).



Functional grouping definitions (step 4).



Top-level general models and forensic area profiles (steps 5 – 7).



Top-level forensic profile (step 8).



Constructive procedure for extensibility.



Metric results.



Application analysis.

This chapter discusses the model implementation patterns and functional
groups resulting from the analysis of the specific models. The functional groupings
provided a finer grain decomposition of the functions defined in the scenario usecases. The constructive analysis resulted in the definition of the top-level models
along with their associated profiles. Additional constructive analysis of the use-case
profiles yielded the top-level profile. This overall, repeatable, approach was defined in
the constructive procedure. Metrics were recorded to assess the resulting
commonality across models. Lastly, the results of the animation application will be
discussed.

4.1 Specific model Analysis (step 4)
4.1.1 Pattern analysis
The two types of patterns of interest were structural static patterns and
behavioral patterns. The static patterns described the underlying architectural data
structures of the forensic scenario. The behavioral patterns described the scenario and
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the resulting control flow as dictated by the operating system or applications, per the
scenario. The patterns were derived from analysis of the implementation models.
4.1.1.1

Forensic static patterns (data structures).

There were six types of (non-unique) static structures which were identified
from the analysis of the specific models. Structure was dictated by the classes and the
associations between classes. The static structures included:


Single Elements.



Unordered Lists (Multiple Elements).



Ordered Lists (Multiple Elements).



Multiple List (e.g. Directory/File System).



Pointers to Lists.



Amplification of additional data.

These static structures were further refined by considering the behavioral operations
that could be performed on these structures and are shown in Table 4-1 as the forensic
static patterns. The table identifies the pattern name, the specific structure utilized for
the pattern, whether or not that the elements in the pattern needed to be ordered, and
the behavior aspects of the patterns. The behavior of the pattern was defined by the
operations that could be performed on the classes of the structure, such as being able
to add or delete elements or to read/write elements. It also should be noted that each
of these patterns could be implemented with or without nested data types. The nested
data types provided additional flexibility when modeling complicated data structures.

84

Table 4-1. Discovered Forensic Static Patterns
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Pattern

Base
Structure

Ordered

Size Varies

Modifiable

Example

Static unordered elements
non-modifiable (SUEN)

Singe Element

no

no

no

FAT Boot Sector

Static unordered elements
modifiable (SUEM)

Single
Element

no

no

yes

OS and Applications

Static unordered list
modifiable (SULM)

Ordered List

no

no

yes

Collection of Clusters/Blocks

Static ordered list
modifiable (SOLM)

Ordered List

yes

no

yes

Bitmaps

Dynamic unordered list
modifiable (DULM)

Unordered List no

yes

yes

Process and Process File
Descriptors

Dynamic ordered list
modifiable (DOLM)

Ordered List

yes

yes

yes

Process List

yes

yes

yes

Directory

DynamicOrderedTableMo
difieableOfDynamicUnor
deredTablesModifiable
(DOTMDUTM)
Multiple Types Reference
(MTR)

Pointers-tolists

no

N/A

N/A

NTFS:MFTEntry ,
EXT:Blockgroup

Detail

Detail

no

no

no

N/A

Multiple List
(Directory)

In describing the forensic patterns, it is useful to describe each of the structures on
which the forensic patterns are based and to identify how these structures are refined
by the addition of operations and nested data types.
Single elements structure. The single elements contain one or more key-value
pairs, as shown in Figure. 4-1. The key of the key-value pair has a unique string that
is associated with a value that is of type string. The single element structure has the
characteristics that it typically does not have multiple instantiations and is static, that
is, the number of key-value pairs cannot be added or deleted. Figure 4-2 shows the
Single Element pattern with nested key-value pairs. In general, any of the structural
patterns may consist of a nested collection of key-value pair collections. In the case of
the diagram, the SingleElement has an attribute kvGroup that had a type of KeyValueGroup
that itself has one or more attributes of type KeyValue . The notion of nested types
allows modeling flexibility of more complicated data structures. Note that OCL
constraints are shown to ensure that there are no duplicates in the key-value pairs and
key-value groups.
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Figure. 4-1. Single Elements Structure

Figure 4-2. Single Element Structure Nested Data Types

As an example, this pattern applied to the FAT boot data structure is shown in
Figure 4-3. In the case of the FAT boot sector, the order of values is not of concern.
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This example was the SUEN pattern which was mapped to the table from [55]. The
number of attributes did not change (i.e., it remained static). In addition, these values
were startup values and were not modifiable.

Figure 4-3. SUEN Example

Lists structure. Lists are modeled as collections, as depicted in Figure 4-4.
Lists modeled utilizing nested datatypes are depicted in Figure 4-5. The list collection
class is composed of one or more Node elements. The Node element consisted of a
key-value pair. The key is a unique string that is associated with a value that is of type
string. There are three characteristics of a list that are of interest, ordered versus
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unordered, constant size versus variable size, and whether the values of the key-value
pair are modifiable.
The unordered list is a collection of 1-to-many of the associated type Node.
There was no ordering of elements imposed by this structure. Data structures in which
order does not matter would utilize this model representation.
In other cases, the list needs to be an ordered. The ordered list contained an
association of the collection class to one initial entry element. From this initial
element, the next Node can be reached via the next association. This is analogous to a
linked list. There is an inherent order in this representation enforced by the structure
of the model. As an example, the bitmap data structure was modeled as an ordered list
to allow the next element in the sequence to be selected. Specifically, in the EXT
block bitmap, when allocating blocks to a file it was optimal to choose the blocks
sequentially to prevent fragmentation.
If the collection membership needs to change, the operations to either add or
delete Nodes are required. An example of a list that never change size is the FAT
table. An example of a list that requires new members to be added or deleted from the
collection is the list of operating system processes in a process list.
Also of note was that this pattern consisted of two types of constraints. In the
Figure 4-4, there was a required constraint to ensure that the collection class contained
a set, ensuring that each Node was unique by having a different key in the key-value
pair. The second type of constraint was a transitive closure constraint which ensures a
Node is not visited more than once to prevent infinite loops.
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Figure 4-4. List Structures

There were no common patterns in this work whose list implementation only
needed their data structure values read and not modified. The list data structures
needed to be modified or be written with a new value. For example, the EXT block
bitmap not only required a read operation but also required a write operation to either
set or reset its value.
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Figure 4-5. List Structures with Nested Data Types
Multiple lists structure. A multiple list pattern is shown in Figure 4-6. This
pattern consisted of an ordered list and an unordered list, which were used for the
directory structure in the FAT file system use-case model and the file system structure
in the browser use-case model.
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Figure 4-6. Multiple List - Directory Structure
Pointer-to-lists structure. This pattern showed the association of multiple
tables of different types and defined groupings of associations. This pattern was used
to model tables that had rows with lists of different types within the row as shown in
Figure 4-7. This pattern grouped different types of lists. Each type of lists could have
zero or more instances. An example would be the NTFS MFT. Each row contained a
set of attributes, with each attribute being defined by a list of types.

Figure 4-7. Pointers-to-lists Structure
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Detail structure. This pattern utilized a UML dependency class to document
additional information which was associated between the classes on both ends of the
association (see Figure 4-8). This pattern was not related in modeling the underlying
forensic data structures, but was utilized to provide additional detail between data
classes within the model. Figure 4-9 provides an example in xtUML to show how the
dependency class was utilized. In the figure there is a dependency class BootDetails on
the association which links BootSector and OS. The association class contained the
specific model forensic attributes which were read by the OS. The data types for these
attributes are identified in Figure 4-10. The actual values of these forensic attributes
were not defined in the data type; rather, the attribute data types were defined by the
Details type. The Details types defined attributes providing specific information
which may be of interest a more technically advanced digital forensic stakeholder.

Figure 4-8. Detail Structure
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Figure 4-9. Detail Pattern FAT Example

Figure 4-10. Details OAL Snippet

4.1.1.2

Dynamic patterns (Scripts).

The dynamic patterns in this work were utilized to show the control flow of the
scenario. The thread of control was scripted to the specific scenario and was at a very
abstract level. The three primary dynamic patterns (shown in Figure 4-11) seen in this
work were:


Case 1: Initial state to final state via a sequential set of intermediated states.



Case 2: Initial state to a target state and remain in the target state.
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Case 3: Transition from the initial state to a target state back to an initial
state.

Case 1. Given a start event, the state machine started at an initial state and
stepped through a sequence of states until the end state was reached. Each state
contained a set of steps (implemented in OAL) that resulted in a corresponding set of
attributes to be modified to achieve the desired end-effect of the state, after which
there was a transition to the next state.
Case 2. Given an event, the initial state transitioned to the appropriate target
state. The target state was the final state.
Case 3. Given an event, the state machine transitioned to the appropriate target
state, executed the requisite set of steps, and transitioned back to the initial state.

Figure 4-11. Dynamic Patterns

The Dynamic Pattern implemented per forensic use-case for this work is shown in
Table 4-2.
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Table 4-2. Dynamic Pattern Cases
Use-Case
Dynamic Pattern
File Systems
Case 1

Implemented By
OS

Browsers

Case 3

Browser App

RAM

Case 2

App

RAM

Case 3

OS

4.1.2 Functional grouping definitions.
The functional groups were defined by further analyzing the functional area
use-cases based on what was discovered during the development of the specific
models. The requisite high level functionality of the underlying computational
mechanism was identified along with the relevant data structures. The functional
groupings are a key component in defining the top-level models.
File systems. Based on the analysis of the scenario, the file system
functionality could be further decomposed into four major grouping, the
RetrieveFSMetaData, AllocateToDUStorage, DetermineStorageLocation, and AccessDirectory.

These functions are operating system functions. The RetrieveFSMetaData retrieves the
file system metadata. The operating system utilizes this information to determine how
to interact with the file system, such as determining the location of file system data
structures. AllocateToDUStorage either reads or allocates contents to memory. The
DetermineStorageLocation, determines the data units to which file contents are to be

written. The AccessDirectory function accesses the directory to access the meta data of
the file. Table 4-3 maps the file system use-case activities/functions to the supporting
functional grouping functions.

96

Table 4-3. File System Use-Case Extension
Use-Case Activity/Function
Supporting Functional Group
AllocateFile
AccessDirectory
AllocateFile
RetrieveFSMetaData
AllocateFile
DetermineStorageLocation
AllocateFile
AllocateToDUStorage
DeleteFile
AccessDirectory
DeleteFile
RetrieveFSMetaData
DeleteFile
DetermineStorageLocation
DeleteFile
AllocateToDUStorage

Table 4-4 shows the mapping of the specific file system forensic data
structures being modeled to the functional grouping of this work.

Table 4-4. Key Forensic Data Structures Mapped to Functional Groups
FAT
NTFS
EXT
RetrieveFSMetaD
ata
DetermineStorage
Location
AcessDirectory

Boot
sector,FSINF
O
FAT

Directory
Entries

AllocateToDUStor Clusters
age

$Boot

$Bitmap,$STANDARD_IN
FORMATION,$DATA,$A
TTRIBUTE_LIST
$FILE_NAME,$IDX_ROO
T,$IDX_ALLOCATION,$
BITMAP
Clusters

Superblock,
group
descriptor
Inodes, inode
bitmap
Directory
Entries
Blocks

Figure 4-12 shows the extended use-case incorporating the additional
implementation functions resulting from the data structure groupings that emerged
through the analysis. These are operating system functions that are contained in the
file system component in the use-case. These functions extend the use-cases
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AllocateFile and DeallocateFile activities/functions and were added using the include

relationship shown in the extended use-case.

Figure 4-12. File System Extended Use-Case
Browser. The decomposed functions for the functional groupings for the
browser use-case are, FSStoreRetrieve and DbStoreRetrieve. These functions simply
store information gathered by the browser when visiting web sites and downloading
files.
The file system representation in the browser model did not need to be
modeled to the same level of detail that was required for the file system use-case. The
browser model needed only show how the file system could be traversed to gain
access to the specified file. Table 4-5 maps the RAM use-case activities/functions to
the supporting functional grouping functions.
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Table 4-5. Browser Use-Case Extension
Use-Case Activity/Function
Browse
Browse
Download
Download
EnableCookie
EnableCookie

Supporting Functional Group
FSStoreRetrieve
DbStoreRetrive
FSStoreRetrieve
DbStoreRetrive
FSStoreRetrieve
dbStoreRetrive

Figure 4-13 shows the updated browser scenario use-case, which includes the
additional decomposed model functionality.

Figure 4-13. Browser Extended Use-Case
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RAM. The decomposed functions for the functional groupings for the RAM
use-case are, ManageProcesses, CreateSocketConnections, MapSockets, and
ManageConnections. ManageProcesses provides the functionality to create processes

and to provide the equivalent process information that would be displayed by a
standard process list command line. The ManageConnections function provides the
equivalent network connection information which would be displayed by a standard
network connection list command line. The CreateSocketConnection function allows
the application to create a socket network connection. The MapSockets function
creates an entry in the process handle table for a socket. This table is utilized to
associate a process with a network connection. Table 4-6 maps the RAM use-case
activities/functions to the supporting functional grouping functions.

Table 4-6. RAM Use-Case Extension
Use-Case Activity/Function
ListProcesses
StartApplication
CreateNetworkConnection
CreateNetworkConnection
ListNetworkConnections

Supporting Functional Group
ManageProcesses
ManageProcesses
MapSockets
CreateSocketConnection
ManageConnections

The updated scenario diagram, with the additional decomposed functionality,
is shown in Figure 4-14. The diagram included the OS_ProcessManager component
functionality to address a process life cycle, which included process creation and
scheduling. Also, the diagram included the OS_IOManager component functionality to
address network communication.
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Figure 4-14. RAM Extended Use-Case
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4.2 Top-level model & profile constructive analysis (steps 5-7).
The following sections identify the requisite analysis and validation in
determining the top-level models and the associated profiles.

4.2.1 File systems
The top-level model for file systems was based on the file system functional
groupings. Table 4-7 maps the functional groupings for the top-level model and the
implementation data structures patterns used to implement the top-level model.
The file system top-level model is shown in Figure 4-15. The associated data
structures from the top-level model are identified in Figure 4-16. The DataUnitManager
is a collection class of DataUnit, which models disk storage. The Directory is a
combination of lists used to model the directory structure and is also a collection class
of DirectoryEntry. DirectoryEntry contains file information along with references to the
appropriate set of DataUnit . The FSMetaStore contains the file system’s metadata. The
OS contains the state machine.

Table 4-7. File System Functional Group/Components to Patterns
Supporting Function/Component
Pattern
RetrieveFSMetaData
SUEN
DetermineStorageLocation
DOLM
AccessDirectory
DOTMDUTM
AllocateToDUStorage
DULM
Application
SUEN
OS
SUEM
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Figure 4-15. File System Top-Level Model
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Figure 4-16. File System Top-level Model Data Types

The operating system dictated the control flow for the file system scenario.
The behavioral states and definitions are shown in Table 4-8. The state machine is
shown in Figure 4-17. The states represented the set of steps to perform the scenario
based on a file “save as” event or a “delete file” event. The “save as” event was
initiated at the word processing application. The delete event was the result of moving
the file to trash. In the file system scenario, the state machine went through a
sequential set of steps for allocation. Based on an operator-initiated delete, the state
machine also traversed through a sequential set of states. These states were the same
across all the implementations, however, the ordering of the states differed.

Table 4-8. File System States
State
Initial
BootStructDataDeteremined
FileLocDetermined
FileEntryCreated
WriteContents
FileSaveComplete
DeleteInitialized
DirectoryEntryCleared
AllocationStructuresCleared
Complete

Description
Initialize scenario
File System Meta Data is read by operation
system
Determine location of target directory and file
location within the directory
Create initial file entry structure and/or fill in
initial information for the file entry
Determine location to write contents/write
consents
Intermediate state between actions
Initialize data structures for delete
Clear/Unallocated file structures in target
directory
Clear/Unallocated file allocation data structures t
End State
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Figure 4-17. File System Top-Level State Machine

The key profile elements for the file system static profile are identified in
Table 4-9. The static profile was derived from the top-level static model and is shown
in Figure 4-18. The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes
which represented the forensic data structures. In addition, the data types that were
consistent with the forensic attributes were utilized to define the data types of the tags
for the stereo types. The tag data types (see Figure 4-19) were categorized as related
to either evidence, operating system, and applications. In addition, a time data type is
identified along with enumerated types for file system identification. Constraints were
added to ensure unique elements in collections and to address transitive closure to
prevent infinite loops. The dynamic profile for the states of the state machine is
depicted in Figure 4-20.
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Table 4-9. File System Profile Definition
Top-level Element
Top-level
Profile Element
Type
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Stereotype, Data
Type, or Tag

Profile Meta
Class

Description
Operating System.
Application whose content is
stored in a file.
Contains the file system meta
data.
Contains other directories or
directory entries. Top level
directory is the “root”.
Contains the meta information
for the files or subdirectories.
A set of references to
DataUnit(s) where the file
content is written.
Data structure which keeps
track of available data units.
An individual cell/element in
the DUAllocationMechanism.
The mechanism which
manages the access to the file
system data units.
An individual data unit which
can be written to. Typically a
cluster or block.

OS
Application

Class
Class

OS
Application

Stereotype
Stereotype

Class
Class

FSMetaStore

Class

FSMetaStore

Stereotype

Class

Directory

Class

DirectoryRoot

Stereotype

Class

DirectoryEntry

Class

DirectoryEntry

Stereotype

Class

FileDataUnitRef

Class

FileDataUnitRef

Stereotype

Class

DUAllocationMecha
nism
AllocationCell

Class

DUAllocationMec
hanism
AllocationCells

Stereotype

Class

Stereotype

Class

DataUnitMangement

Class

DataUnitMangem
ent

Stereotype

Class

DataUnit

Class

DataUnit

Stereotype

Class

Class
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Figure 4-18. File System Static Profile
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Figure 4-19. File System Profile Tag Types
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Figure 4-20. File System State Behavior Profile

4.2.2 Browsers
The browser scenario was at a higher level of abstraction than the file system
use-case. The same model was used across all three implementations; the differences
were with respect to the ways in which the scenarios were initially configured. With
regard to the file system, file paths and files names were different across
implementations. Additionally, databases, tables, and table contents had different
configurations between implementations.
The mapping of the browser functional groups and the pattern implementation
is shown in Table 4-10.

Table 4-10. Browser Functional Group/Components to Patterns
Supporting Function/Component
Pattern
DbStoreRetrieve/ DataBase
Unique
FSStoreRetrieve
DOTMDUTM (Directory)
Browser
SUEM
OS
SUEM

The browser top-level class diagram is shown in Figure 4-21. The associated
data types for the top-level diagram are depicted in Figure 4-22. The major classes in
the class model were the WebBrowser, the Database, the OS, and the classes
representing the files system (Directory and File) that were collection classes. The
Downloads, History, and Cookie data types are consistent with the forensic attributes.

The WebBrowser application contained the state machine. The browser state machine
is shown in Figure 4-23.
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Figure 4-21. Browser Top-Level Model
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Figure 4-22. Browser Top-Level Model Data Types

The state machine states and their descriptions are in Table 4-11. The
application state changed based on one of three transition events:


Download: An artifact has been down loaded.



History update: Change in URL.



Cookie update: Cooking information is stored.

After the transition change has been completed the application goes back to its typical
state, ActionProcessed.

Table 4-11. Browser States
State
ActionProcessed
HistoryUpdated
CookieUpdated

DownloadUpdated

Description
This is the typical state, waiting to process a user
request
When a URL is visited the history is updated
When cookies are enabled and a site is visited
which utilizes cookies, cooking information is
updated
When a user performs download, the download
information is updated
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Figure 4-23. Browser State Machine

The key profile elements for the Browser profile are identified in Table 4-12.
The static profile was derived from the Browser top-level static model and is shown in
Figure 4-24. The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes that
represented the forensic data structures. The profile also identified OCL constraints.
In addition, the data types that reflected the forensic attributes were utilized to define
the data types of the tags for the stereotypes. The tag data types, shown in Figure 4-25,
were categorized as related to either evidence, operating system, or application. In
addition, data types for time and an enumeration for browser types were identified.
Constraints were added to ensure unique elements in collections and to address
transitive closure to prevent infinite loops. The dynamic profile for the behavior states
is depicted in Figure 4-26.
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Table 4-12. Browser Top-level to Profile
Top-level Element Top-level Type Profile Element

Stereotype, Data
Type, or Tag

Profile Meta Class
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Directory

Class

Directory

Stereotype

Class

File
Content

Class
Class

File
Content

Stereotype
Stereotype

Class
Class

Browser
OS

Class
Class

Browser
OS

Stereotype
Stereotype

Class
Class

Database
Table

Class
Class

Database
Table

Stereotype
Stereotype

Class
Class

Row

Class

Row

Stereotype

Class

Description
Directory. Starts at
“root”. Contains File(s).
File. Contains contents.
Has metadata associated
with File.
Content of file.
Web browser
application.
Operating System.
Database. Contains
Tables.
Contains Row(s).
Contain data and has
meta data on row.
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Figure 4-24. Browser Use-Case Profile
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Figure 4-25. Browser Tag Data Types
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Figure 4-26. Browser State Behavior Profile

4.2.3 RAM
The RAM scenario was at a higher level of abstraction than the file system
use-case. Due to the lack of available information for implementation specifics, the
class and state machines were a high level, generic, abstract, textbook-configuration
that represented all the configurations. The top-level dynamic and static models for
RAM were the same as the implementation specific models. The differences between
the models were in the terminology used to describe the specifics of the process and
network evidence. These difference were reflected in the data types. The patterns
associated with the functional areas, applications, and OS are shown in Table 4-13.
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Table 4-13. RAM Functional Group/Components to Patterns
Supporting Function/Component

Pattern

ManageProcesses
CreateSocketConnection
ManageConnections
MapSockets
CommandLine
Application
OS

DOLM
DULM
DULM
DULM
SUEN
SUEM
SUEM

The RAM class diagram for the top-level model is shown in Figure 4-27. The
association data types for the RAM top-level model are identified in Figure 4-28 and
represent the key forensic attributes. The OS contained the state machine and dictated
the control flow. The state machine for the OS is shown in Figure 4-29 and the state
machine for the Application is shown in Figure 4-30. The viewing tool modeled the
output of the OS commands that provided either a list of running processes or the open
connections. The ProcessManagement class was a collection of processes executing on
the machine. The collection process (i.e., process tree) was implemented as an
ordered collection. The process had an association with a FileDescriptorTable (i.e.,
handle table) that was a collection of available handles. In this case, the model
represented socket file descriptors. The Socket was associated with a
CommunicationsObject which is a member of the ConnectionManagement collection

class. The application itself was associated with the OS and if it was a network
enabled application it was associated with Socket. The OS was in a SteadyState unless
there was an action:


to add a process (e.g., application starting up), or
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to add a socket (e.g., application establishes a network connection).

These actions occurred when a new application instance was created. The
application had a state machine, and depending on the initial startup parameters, was
either in a network enabled state or not. The OS states and descriptions are listed in
Table 4-14 and the application state machine states and descriptions are listed in Table
4-15.
The run of the scenario set up various instances of an applications and modeled
the output of the viewing tool. The system process list or open connection list was
shown by executing the View Tool, which was representative of command lines for
processes and network connections.

124

125
Figure 4-27. RAM Top-Level Model

Figure 4-28. RAM Top-level Model Data Types

Table 4-14. RAM OS States
State (OS)
Description
SteadyState
Operating system waiting state
ProcessAdded Process is added to process list
SocketAdded Process is added to process list and a socket handle is
created

Figure 4-29. RAM OS State Machine
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Table 4-15. RAM Application States
State (Application)
Description
NotInit
Application not initialized
Executing
Application is initialized and is not a
network enabled
ExecutingAsNetworkClient Application is initialized and is network
enabled

Figure 4-30. RAM Application State Machine
The key profile elements for the RAM profile are identified in Table 4-16. The
static profile was derived from the RAM top-level static model and is shown in Figure
4-31. The profile stereotypes were consistent with the top-level classes which
represented the forensic data structures. In addition, the data types that reflected the
forensic attributes were utilized to define the data types of the tags for the stereotypes.
The tag data types, shown in Figure 4-32, were categorized as related to either
evidence, operating system, or application. In addition, data types for time and an
enumeration for Application types were identified. Constraints were added to ensure
unique elements in collections and to address transitive closure to prevent infinite
loops. The behavior profile for the OS states is depicted in Figure 4-33 and the
behavioral profile for the Application behavior states is depicted in Figure 4-34.
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Table 4-16. RAM Top-level Model To Profile
Top-level Element
Top- Profile Element
level
Type
Application
Class Application

Stereotype,
Data Type,
or Tag
Stereotype

Profile
Meta
Class
Class

Class OS
Class CommandLineTool

Stereotype
Stereotype

Class
Class

Socket

Class Socket

Stereotype

Class

CommsSocketObject

Class CommsSocketObject

Stereotype

Class

ConnectionManagement Class ConnectionManagement Stereotype
ProcessMangement
Class ProcessManagement
Stereotype
Process
Class Process
Stereotype

Class
Class
Class

FileDescriptorTable

Class FileDescriptorTable

Stereotype

Class

FileDescriptor

Class FileDescriptor

Stereotype

Class
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OS
ViewingTool

Description

Application whose process and
network connections are of interest.
Operating System
Command line tool to either get
process list or open connections.
Provides API for application to receive
and send information.
Represents the network stack between
the application Sockets to the network
“wire”.
Maintains a list of network connections.
Maintains the list of processes.
An individual processes. Contains the
forensic information of interest.
Contains the network handles for the
process of interest.
Individual file handle for a network
object.
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Figure 4-31. RAM Static Profile
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Figure 4-32. RAM Profile Tag Data Types

Figure 4-33. RAM OS State Profile
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Figure 4-34. RAM Application State Profile

4.2.4 Model equivalence
The analysis determined that the top-level models were equivalent to the
implementation specific models in all three forensic areas of this work.
File systems. The file system top-level model was equivalent to the file
system implementation specific models. The results for the model equivalent scripts
are shown in Table 4-17 for the file system area. The only significant anomalies were
due to the differences in when time was recorded across the file systems, specifically
with regard to the type of time stamps (e.g., modify, access, create, write) and where
the time stamps were located (e.g., at the file entry level or the parent directory level).
For the implementation differences, the forensic attribute for time was at a too low
level of abstraction. If the time attribute was deemed to be of significant interest, it
would need to be re-evaluated and the appropriate level of abstraction would need to
be defined. For instance, perhaps the time on file updates might be of interest.
There were also some minor difference in the order in which the forensic
attributes were generated, however this had no effect on the forensic attribute values.
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Table 4-17. File System Equivalence
Specific Common Steps
Total
Model

with Top-Level

% Step Delta

Steps

Equivalent?

Comments

Model
FAT

30

38 78 Due to how FS

Yes

implements times
EXT

31

37 82 Due to how FS

Yes

implements times
NTFS

34

38 89 Due to how FS

Yes

implements times

Browsers. The browser top-level model was equivalent to the browser
implementation specific models. Since the specific models and top-level models were
the same, the differences in the model were in the scenario configuration of the file
system and data base models in the browser implementation.
There were a few instances where the location of these attributes could not be
found in the existing documentation. It was verified that the relevant information does
exist in the browser, however, the available documentation in the proprietary
implementation was not readily available. In addition, there was slight variance in
how the implementations stored the information as variables in the data base. For
example, in the download forensic attributes, for the name of the downloaded
document, one browser included the path in its attribute and another implementation
used separate variables for name and for path. Overall, there was an approximately
94% mapping between each of the specific implementation attributes and that of the
browser forensic attributes.
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RAM. The RAM top-level model was equivalent to the RAM implementation
specific models. Since the specific models and top-level models were the same the
differences in the model were in the scenario configurations with regard to the process
attributes and network attributes. As with the browsers, the documentation for the
specific proprietary implementations was incomplete. However, there was only one
instance in which the attribute name could not be determined. Overall, there was an
approximately 95% mapping between each of the specific implementation attributes
and that of the RAM forensic attributes.

4.3 Digital forensic profile constructive analysis (step 8)
The static digital forensic profile was constructed by integrating the forensic
use-case profiles. Since the behavior profiles were use-case specific they did not
change from the area behavior profiles and are not addressed in this section. The
description of the profile elements are provided in Appendix A.
The resulting profile packages are depicted in Figure 4-35 and further described
in Table 4-18.

Figure 4-35. DF Profile Package View
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Table 4-18. DF Profile Package Description
Profile Package
Description
DFOS
Operating system stereotypes.
DFFileSystem
File system stereotypes.
DFApplication
Application stereotypes.
DFRAM
RAM stereotypes.
DFData Types
Data types supporting profile stereotypes
DFEvidenceTypes
Evidence data types supporting profile
stereotypes.

The operating systems were common across the categories. As a result, the OS
stereotypes were transferred from the area profiles to a new OS profile as shown in
Figure 4-36. The OS profile contains all of the OS elements that were required by the
area forensic profiles. In this profile the OS is composed of:


ProcessManager: partially equivalent to the OS in the RAM.



IOManager: partially equivalent to the OS in the RAM.



FileSystemManagerDetailed: equivalent to the OS in the File System Profile.



FileSystemManager: equivalent to the OS in the Browser Profile.

To show that stereotypes can extend other types of UML meta-classes, OsUserCall,
OsKernalCall, and ApiCall stereotypes extending the Association meta-class are

included in the OS profile.
Since the browser itself is an application, the Browser profile was the basis for
the Application profile. This was accomplished by incorporating stereotypes from
both the File System and RAM area profiles in the modeled application. The various
application stereotypes were inherited from the Application class (see Figure 4-37).
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The DF File System Profile, shown in Figure 4-38 is similar to the associated
File system area profile, without the operating system and application stereotypes.
Likewise, the DF RAM Profile, Figure 4-39, is similar to RAM area profile, without
the operating system and applications stereotypes.
Lastly, the profiles DF Evidence Types, shown in Figure 4-40, are directly
related to the forensic attributes. The DF Supporting Types, shown in Figure 4-41,
provided the data types for application types, OS, and specific data types for the
detailed file system model. In addition, a DFTime data type was identified with
enumerations to be used in identifying specific configurations. It should be noted that
OCL constraints were included to:


Ensure that collections elements had unique keys.



Transitive closure to prevent infinite loops.



Time attributes ranges were defined.
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Figure 4-36. DF OS Profile
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Figure 4-37. DF Application Profile
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Figure 4-38. DF File System Profile
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Figure 4-39. DF RAM Profile
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Figure 4-40. DF Evidence Types
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Figure 4-41. DF Types

4.4 Metric results
Figure 4-42 identifies the TLAM results. The file system top-level model
resulted in the greatest reduction in TLAM case 1. Both the browser and RAM toplevel models had a reduction of 3 to 1. The second TLAM case shows that there is a 0
percent reduction of elements when the browser and RAM top-level models are
compared to each of their respected implementations. In the browser and RAM usecases, the model implementations and top-level models are the same, therefore there is
no reduction seen for TALM case 2 and the minimum reduction ratio is seen for
TLAM case 1. On the other hand, the file system top-level model shows significant
reductions in elements when compared to the NTFS and EXT implementations. This
was reflective in that the complexity of the NTFS and EXT implementations are
significantly greater than the complexity of the top-level model equivalent. The
results indicated that for implementations which were 100% common were at a
maximum level of abstraction.
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Figure 4-42. TLAM Results
Figure 4-43 identifies the metrics results for ICM. The set of common patterns
were defined as the patterns utilized in at least two of the use-cases. ICM case 1
shows that all the implementations had a relatively high degree of common pattern
usage. The browser and RAM use-cases had no variation for the ICM metric. This
was due to the implementations being identical.

The file system implementations

showed a variation in the metric since their implementations vary.
ICM case 2 shows that the browser and RAM use-cases have a value of 1
showing maximum commonality, which was as expected. On the other hand the file
system use-case shows less than 100% commonality. Investigating the file system
use-case further, the ICM was applied to three aspects of the file system use-case
implementations, the application, the operating system, and the functional groups.
The calculation for these aspects were:
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Operating System: 1



Application: 1



Functional group: .72

The operating system and applications were common across implementations.
Further investigation of applying ICM case 2 to the functional groups is shown in
Figure 4-44. The Data Unit Allocation functional group was relatively simple
functionality representing the data units of the file system. This group was simply
modeled as a collection across all the implementations. Other than naming (e.g.
blocks, clusters), the model implementation of this simple functionality is common
across the implementations. There were also similarities in the FS Meta Store
functional group that also has relatively simple functionality in that primarily
functions as a store. However, there was a significant differences in implementations
in the Data Unit Allocation and Directory functional groups which were reflected in
the resulting ICM case 2 calculation.
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Figure 4-43. ICM Results

Figure 4-44. ICM File System Results

The results for ICM case 3 is shown in Figure 4-45. The results show that
there is commonality between the use-cases.
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Figure 4-45. ICM Case 3 (Across Use-Case) Results
Metrics summary/conclusions.
The file system use-case top-level model showed significant reduction of
elements with the abstracted top-level model when compared to the detailed models.
However, this was not the case with the browser or RAM use-cases since the
implementations of the specific models were the same as the top-level model.
Commonality was seen throughout the implementations within the forensic
areas and across implementations. This commonality varied significantly but
increased as the level of abstraction increased. The metrics results were supportive
that there was commonality across the models which was consistent with what was
expected by inspection of the implementations.
An important observation was that a higher degree of commonality between the
implementations corresponded to a smaller reduction in the number of elements in the
top-level model when compared against the specific model implementations. It was
also observed that less commonality between implementations was an indicator of
increased complexity across the use-case. This is suggestive that there is an inverse
relationship between commonality and complexity, as measured by the level of
abstraction between the top-level model and implementation models. Another
significant observation is that the commonality in model implementations is
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suggestive that there is commonality in the actual computational mechanisms which
were the subject of the model.

4.5 Constructive procedure for model extension
The constructive method to extend top-level models and/or extend the digital
forensic profile is outlined in Figure 4-46.

Figure 4-46. Constructive Method
This work has demonstrated this constructive method was repeatable by developing
the top-level models, the profiles, and the updated use-case diagrams for the three
scenarios on which this work was focused.
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There are three possible cases in which this constructive method would be
utilized:
Case 1: Adding implementations to an already existing use-case.
Case 2: Abstraction level changes.
Case 3: Adding a new forensic use-case.

Case 1. Adding new implementations may result in further refinement of the
top-level model and possible modifications to the profiles. The new implementation
would have been developed utilizing the existing modeling objectives and would start
on step 2.. After implementation, the transformation script for the new model
implementation would need to be developed, executed and used to validate model
equivalency.
Case 2. A change in abstraction would have required a change in the use-case
scenario and forensic attributes starting at step 1. This may also result in an
alternative use-case top-level model and possible modifications to the profiles.
Case 3. A new use-case would result in all the steps to be exercised. A new
top-level model and use-case profile would result along with potential changes to the
overarching forensic profile.

4.6 Application analysis
Visual animation description. The GUI depicted the application, operating
system, and the various file system data structures, which included, directories, FAT,
boot sectors, and clusters. The display, without detailed information, is shown in
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Figure 4-47. The additional GUI details which provide the higher fidelity for a more
advanced stakeholder is shown in Figure 4-48.
The animation showed the component that determined the thread of control
and the data structure which was the focus of the thread of control for a given time.
The thread of control was typically an application or operating system component.
The initial conditions were set for the relevant attributes of the directory, FAT, cluster,
application, and operating system model elements. The initial state was configured by
the initial configuration scripts. There were four different scenarios demonstrated for
the use-case. The initial configuration varied for each of the scenarios; the other
aspects of the model (e.g., class diagrams, state machine diagrams, OAL, and the
application source code) required no change. During the animation, the user selected
the “Next” button to go to the next step of the animation. The next animation step
occurred when a forensic attribute of the data structure changed, when the source of
the thread of control changed, or when the target forensic data structure changed. The
method chosen to show the next step was to show an arrow between the source and
target components. The top-level description of the next step action was on the link.
A more detailed description of the next step action was provided at the top of the
display. These detailed descriptions utilized the detailed model pattern previously
identified. For stakeholders requiring additional information, the following display
options were available:
 Details: Provided the underlying detailed information for a particular
forensic attribute, such as a top-level description and the bit position.
 Location (Loc): Provided the cluster location of the data structure.
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 Notes: Provided additional descriptive information, such as, column headers
of the Directories.
 Evaluation (Eval): Provided additional information, such as slack.
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Figure 4-47. Application View (No Details)
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Figure 4-48. Application View (Detailed)

Expert review. It should be noted that the examiners were exposed only to the
application and not the other aspects of this work. As they observed a demonstration
of the application they were asked to comment on the following:


Would this type of animated application be useful (as illustrated by the
FAT file allocation/deallocation) from an educator/student or analyst
stakeholder role?



Would this type of animated application be useful for other digital forensic
stakeholder roles?

The comments provided by the expert reviewers are summarized in Table 4-19.
Comments were received on following topics: domain complexity, level of detail,
model sources, roles, and how to improve the tool.
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Comment
Topic
Domain
Complexity
Level of Details

Comment (Paraphrased)

Model Sources

Reviewer
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There are uncountable implementations. Even with the file system, there are a lot of versions.

2

Operating system routines may be doing additional actions which may be of interest.

2
2

Model Sources

Implementation details are often not known, the only insight is what is published via research or by
reverse engineering.
What authoritative source is a model based on? Why should the model be trusted?

Roles

For the Student/Educator role, could be used to enhance teaching.

1

Roles

Could be used to help remind/refresh analyst on how to do a procedure.

1

Roles

Judge/Jury: There is too much detail in the application for a judge and jury

2

Roles

Trained analyst already has accepted forensic tools.

2

Roles

Did not see how would be useful for analysis, but good for teaching.

1

Application
Improvement

Adjustments to displays recommended to facilitate in understandability (running list of previous
steps, "not a fan of the arrows").

2

Table 4-19. Expert Review Comments

2

Analysis of comments.
Complexity/Detail. The models can be extended to address the particular
implementation of interested utilizing the constructive method. Extensibility was one
of the objectives of this work. The extensibility is discussed in terms of breadth, the
ability to add new implementations or new versions of extending implementations,
and in terms of depth, adding additional model fidelity. For example, extensibility
was shown by modeling three implementations per scenario. Modeling to various
degrees of detail was demonstrated with the relatively low level modeling of the file
system area as opposed to the very high granularity modeled for the RAM area.
Sources. This work utilized sources that are generally used in an educational
setting or are publically available. For the purpose of this work these sources were
adequate to demonstrate the utility of modeling. Nevertheless, the model could easily
be adjusted to include other sources. For example, one reviewer provided more
authoritative sources for the file system area. The use of these sources would have
resulted in minor changes to the data type naming, but would have had no overall
effect on the focus of this work. However, it should be noted that in modeling efforts,
for the model to be trusted, it is important to obtain agreement from the model
stakeholder on the set of sources on which the model is to be based.
Roles. The indication that this type of tool could be beneficial to facilitate
understandability in digital forensics was encouraging. The focus on the types of
stakeholders to whom this work would be useful was limited to the educational role,
possibly due to the lack of functionality of the demonstrated application. Perhaps
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showing different views or providing more advanced visualizations would have
provided additional insight into how modeling could be beneficial for the analysis role
or other forensic stakeholder roles. In addition, models can be developed to support
other application types. For example, models can be queried and used as a database to
retrieve configuration information or could be used with applications which are based
on artificial intelligence (AI) engines to make inferences or to find patterns in
collected data.
Application improvement. The recommended improvements would be useful
from both an educational perspective and potentially to assist an expert analyst.
In sum, it was found that modeling could be used to develop applications that
would be of use to an educator. The feedback from experts in the field was mixed
about whether the tool would assist those in other forensic roles.

4.7 Findings summary
The overall findings address what was found during implementation, test,
analysis and expert review. The associated finding for the objectives are as follows:

Facilitate learning and analysis application. An application was developed
to provide an animation utilizing artifacts generated by the model. The detail pattern
was utilized to provide additional detail for the more technically advanced
stakeholders.
An issue that came up during the expert review, which was also encountered in
the development of the specific models, was determining the authenticated sources to
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utilize. The availability of the details on the devices and components to be modeled
were limited. From a stakeholder perspective, if the correct authenticated sources are
not utilized, the stakeholder may not have trust in the model. The root cause of the
issue of limited source information is that when new implementations are introduced
to the marketplace, a significant amount of research to identify what is important from
a forensic perspective is required. In one extreme case, the implementations are
proprietary and the relevant details need to be determined. In these cases, research is
performed to reverse engineer the design so that forensic techniques can be developed.
In the other extreme case, the source code is available and therefore everything is
known. However, this is at a much lower level of abstraction that needs to be
understood, which requires significant research to identify what is important from a
forensic perspective. Regardless, research needs to be conducted before a model can
be created.
The expert review identified that the animation application could be useful in
an educational setting. The approach was not as positively received for an analyst
stakeholder roles, but there were some thoughts on how the approach may be useful to
the analyst. There were also concerns with regard to other stakeholder roles which
would need to be addressed.
It can be concluded that modeling can have the potential to facilitate
applications to enhance digital forensic understanding. The question that this work did
not fully satisfy was that multiple stakeholder roles could be addressed by providing
different abstraction levels.
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Reduced complexity. The four findings which relate to the complexity objective
for the constructive method are as follows:


There were nine static patterns and three dynamic patterns found.



Top-level models were developed for the three use-cases.



Model equivalence was shown utilizing transformation.



Metrics provided model commonality and model abstraction measures.
The discovery of model implementation patterns was an indicator that there are

commonalities across actual implementations. The development of the top-level
models demonstrated that a top-level abstract model could be used to describe
different implementations and to reduce complexity. It was shown that the
implementation specific models could be transformed to the top-level model. These
results provided an indicator that an abstracted top-level model can be constructed to
describe different unique implementations by abstracting out how the implementations
are common.
The metrics suggest that there is an inverse relationship between commonality
and complexity, as measured by the level of abstraction between the top-level model
and implementation models. In addition, the commonality in model implementations
which was quantified by the metrics, is suggestive that there is commonality in the
actual computational mechanisms which were the subject of the models.

The degree of abstraction increased as the level of commonality increased.
This is seen with browser and RAM use-cases which were modeled at a higher level of
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abstraction than the file system model and substantiated with the TLAM metric.
There were commonalities identified across model implementations within use-cases
and across use-cases. The ICM provided a relative measure to identify additional
areas in which to investigate potential common functions across implementations.
Extensibility. Extensibility of the constructive method was verified in that its
steps were repeatable. Extensibility of a top-level model was shown within each usecase through the addition of three implementations. The addition of three use-cases
demonstrated the extensibility of the digital forensic profile.
DF UML profile. A digital forensic profile was constructed from this work.
The elements of the profile can be traced to implementation details. The profile was
systematically constructed from top-level models that were constructed from
implementation-specific executable models.
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CHAPTER 5
5

CONCLUSION

5.1 Summary
Digital forensics is complex in that there are a combinatorically explosive
number of types and configurations of digital devices and the components of which
they are composed. In addition, there is a wide range of technical skill required of
digital forensic stakeholders, depending on their roles in their organizations. This
work utilized software engineering techniques based on executable models to identify
two approaches to manage these digital forensic complexities.
The first approach was to manage the complexity by identifying commonalities
across implementations to provide a single abstracted view of these implementations
in a top-level executable model. The top-level model was utilized to develop three
use-case profiles. The three use-case profiles were integrated to construct the digital
forensic profile. The digital forensic profile would extend software modeling
terminology to terminology that is meaningful to individual digital forensic
stakeholders. In addition, a method was identified and demonstrated how the top-level
models and the digital forensic profile could be further extended. Another result from
this approach was the introduction of new metrics to quantify model abstraction and to
identify commonalities between implementations. The second approach was to utilize
artifacts generated from the execution of the model to provide a visualization
application of evidence creation. This visualization would help the targeted
stakeholder to better understand the complexities of a particular digital forensic
scenario. These two approaches could be utilized to facilitate the application of
software engineering-based modeling holistically across the digital forensic domain.
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5.2 Conclusion
Aa a result of this work, the initial questions can be addressed. There is
commonality across actual device and component implementations. That is, there is
utility in applying software engineering modeling techniques to digital forensics for
managing complexity and promoting understandability. In addition, the potential
exists to develop an approach applying software modeling holistically across the
digital forensic domain. This conclusion is based on all the stated objectives of this
work:
1. Addresses domain complexity by utilizing model artifacts to facilitate the
development of applications for learning and analysis which support multiple
digital forensic stakeholder roles.
2. Address domain complexity by providing a top-down view and to find
commonality patterns across implementations.
3. The models are extensible to address the introduction of different
implementations and implementation types.
4. Construct a digital forensic domain specific UML Profile for digital evidence
creation which can be used for future modeling efforts.

The animated visualization application utilizing the behavioral script of the
executable model addressed the first objective. The application showed information at
varying levels of detail for various scenarios. DFCS staff reviewed and commented
on the visualization application. The outcome of the review was that the model-based
application could be useful for understanding to the stakeholders in an educational
environment. The application was able to show various levels of detail, however, the
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expert review brought up concerns with how the application would support the analyst
and other stakeholder roles.
Identifying common patterns across implementations addressed the second
objective. These patterns suggested that there were commonalities across the actual
implementations of components and devices which are of interest to digital forensic
stakeholders. These patterns were used in the development of the top-level models for
the three use-case scenarios. The abstraction level of the top-level model was
quantified in metrics. The top-level models provided an abstract description of the
different implementations. The pattern commonality within a use-case scenario and
across use-case scenarios was quantitatively captured in the metrics.
A repeatable, documented, procedure to extend the top-level models and
digital forensic profiles addressed the third objective. Extending the top-level model
was verified by adding implementations to the use-cases. Extending the top-level
profile was verified by combining the profiles of each use-case.
The digital forensic profile addresses the forth objective. This UML profile, if
utilized, would support future digital forensic modeling efforts.

5.3 Limitations
This work only demonstrated utility for one stakeholder group, educators. The
application developed for this work contained features to provide additional details
and some additional features targeted to the analyst role. However, feedback from
expert reviewers in the analyst community indicated that it was not clear how this
particular type of application would be useful for the analyst or other stakeholder
roles.
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This work utilized open source tools. During the timeframe of this research
was being conducted, xtUML had a significant pedigree and support for the
development of executable models. However, xtUML is not strictly UML compliant
and did not support the requisite UML features required for this work. As an example,
it does not support OCL and profiles. To address the need to develop profiles, a
second environment, Papyrus, which is UML 2.5 compliant was used for the profiling
aspects of this work, meaning that two modeling environments were used in this work.
However, the two Open Source projects have started collaborating to develop a
Papyrus-xtUML environment.
The utility of the top-level models or the utility of profiles was not evaluated
with digital forensic stakeholders. This work focused on identifying why and how
software engineering modeling concepts could be employed to digital forensics.
Assessing the potential utility and impact of applying modeling in the digital forensic
domain was beyond the scope of this work.
There are a combinatorically explosive number of digital forensic scenarios
along with a practically uncountable number of configurations. As such, this number
of scenarios addressed by this work was infinitesimally small. This work focused on
the computational mechanisms within one device in one forensic area at a time. It did
not investigate more complex scenarios utilizing multiple devices. In addition,
addressing virtual environments would be of interest. Additional work will need to be
completed to determine whether the approach in this work can be scaled up to address
additional implementations, use-case scenarios, and forensic areas.
The implemented application only showed one aspect of how modeling can be
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used from an application perspective, a simple animation. Implementing a more
sophisticated animation on additional model scenarios would provide additional
insight into the utility of this approach.
The focus of this work was to show how evidence was created. There could be
other aspects of digital forensics in which modeling could be used. For example, the
information in the model could be used to reason about evidence validity.
Patterns were only touched on in this work and only simple patterns were
identified. To gain a better understanding of commonality, all significant data
structures used in implementations would need to be represented in a model.
The metric results are suggestive that commonality and complexity are
inversely proportional. This result was not rigorously proven.

5.4 Next Steps
This work provided a starting framework for applying software engineering
modeling techniques to digital forensics. The next steps would include:


Assess whether the constructive method scales up.



Evaluate the utility of top-level models and profiles with digital
forensic stakeholders.



Add enhanced visualization techniques to target specific stakeholders.



Determine if modeling can support other types of applications.



Validate that complexity and commonality are inversely proportional.



Address additional stakeholder roles.
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A variety of additional use-cases would need to be modeled to assess whether
the approach scales-up. The constructive method could be assessed for extensibility as
follows:


Add additional forensic areas and associated use-cases,



Add implementations to an existing use-case scenario, and



Model a different level of abstraction for an existing use-case.

As an example, a cloud based scenario involving a combination of network
analysis may be of interest, since it would involve multiple devices and technology
areas (e.g., network, wireless, cloud based services, virtualization). Adding additional
implementations to existing use-case scenarios would provide additional insights on
impacts to the use-cases top-level model. For example, adding additional file system
implementations (e.g., HFS+, HPFS, UFS, VMFS, ZFS) to the file allocation/delete
scenario could further evolve the top-level view. Adding a different level of
abstraction to an existing use-case would provide insights into how additional
stakeholders could utilizing modeling.
Given the top-level models and resultant profiles generated from this work or
follow-on top-level models and profiles developed by assessing the constructive
method, the utility of the top-level models and profiles will need to be addressed. The
utility could be addressed in an educational scenario or in using the profiles to
generate digital forensic models.
Further investigation of how applications could facilitate understanding for
digital forensic stakeholders is warranted. As an example, more advanced
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visualization techniques may have utility. In addition, there may be other applications
of modeling, other than understanding the who, what, when, where, and how of
evidence creation may be of interest. For example, the model provided relationships
between elements and from that perspective the model is equivalent to a database.
Applications can be developed to provide a front-end query to generate reports of
information of interest which may be beneficial in an investigation. Another use is to
develop applications utilizing artificial intelligence techniques to reason about the
evidence.
The relationship between the TLAM and ICM metrics should be further
investigated to determine if the claim that commonality and complexity are indeed
inversely proportional. A proof should be provided to substantiate the claim.
All future investigations should reach out to stakeholders to incorporate their
perspectives. For example:


Legal stakeholders, to identify the potential benefit models could provide
in presenting a case. In addition, insight could be gained into the ways in
which visualization techniques may or may not help in the courtroom.



Law Enforcement stakeholders (e.g., State Police, detectives), to
understand the aspects of the evidence that are important and to understand
the types of applications that would be of use for training purposes.



Educational stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether models
could be tools for educational purposes. Moreover, these individuals could
provide evidence to help develop an understanding of whether formalism
allows for an exchange of ideas between researchers.
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System Analyst stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether model
formalism could help address their comprehension of the underlying
systems or as a means to be able to exchange information. Additionally,
these stakeholders could provide valuable insight into the applications that
would be of use. Finally, these stakeholders would provide information to
help develop an understanding of the authoritative sources that could be
utilized.



Tool Vendors stakeholders, to gain an understanding of whether models
could be used as a method to standardize descriptions of digital forensic
devices and components. Additionally, these stakeholders could provide
information to help to develop an understanding of the utility in developing
digital forensic model standards that would be beneficial for the digital
forensic tool community.

5.5 Contributions of this work
The work provided insights on how modeling would benefit digital forensic in
addressing some of the complexities of the field. The unique contributions of this
work consisted of the following:
1. Modeled the computational mechanisms involved in the creation of digital
forensic evidence,
2. Generated computable model artifacts to facilitate the execution of a digital
forensic relevant animation application,
3. Identified a process to construct top-level implementation views of
computational mechanisms,
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4. Identified modeling patterns to catalog commonalties in computational
mechanisms,
5. Identified metrics to support commonality and abstraction analysis, and
6. Introduced a digital forensic profile along with a process to extend the profile.

The models developed represented the computational mechanisms for the creation
of digital forensic evidence. Since the models were executable, the model’s behavior
could be captured and utilized by an application to animate the model’s behavior.
A repeatable constructive methodology was identified to develop and test abstract
top-level models from implementation specific models. The constructive method was
also utilized to construct profiles. In developing these models, implementation
commonality patterns were identified for the modeled computational mechanisms.
The ICM and TLAM metrics were introduced to assess commonality and abstract
between top-level and implementation specific models.
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Appendix A: Digital Forensic Profile stereotype descriptions
Table A-1 provides descriptions of the stereotypes utilized in the constructed
digital forensic profile.

Table A-1. Digital Forensic profile stereotype description
Profile Package
Profile Element
Profile
Meta
Class/T
ype
OS
OS
Class

Description

OS with no initial
connections.
OS to support detail
file system models.

OS

FileSystemManag Class
erDetail

OS
OS

FileSystemManag Class
er
ProcessManager
Class

OS

IOManager

Class

OS

OsUserCall

Associat
ion

OS

OsKernalCall

Associat
ion

Kernel calls.

OS

ApiCall

Associat
ion

Application

Directory

Class

Application

File

Class

Application
Application

Content
Browser

Class
Class

Application

Database

Class

API call between
components, for
example a socket
call.
Directory. Starts at
“root”. Contains
File(s).
File. Contains
contents. Has
metadata associated
with File.
Content of file.
Web browser
application.
Database. Contains
Tables.
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OS with directory
structure
OS with support of
processes and
process lists
OS with support of
network
connections.
User space call to
the kernel.

Application

Table

Class

Application

Row

Class

Application

CommandLine

Class

Application

Document

Class

Application

General
Application

Class

Application

Application

Class

FileSystem

FSMetaStore

Class

FileSystem

DirectoryRoot

Class

FileSystem

DirectoryEntry

Class

FileSystem

FileDataUnitRef

Class

FileSystem

DUAllocationMe
chanism

Class

FileSystem

AllocationCells

Class

FileSystem

DataUnitMangem
ent

Class
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Database table
contains Row(s).
Contain meta data
on row.
Command line tool
to either get process
list or open
connections
Application whose
content is stored in
a file.
Application whose
process and network
connections are of
interest.
General
Application.
Contains the file
system meta data.
Contains other
directories or
directory entries.
Top level directory
is the “root”.
Contains the meta
information for the
files or
subdirectories.
A set of references
to data unit(s)
where the file
content is written.
Data structure
which keeps track
of available data
units.
An individual
cell/element in the
DUAllocationMech
anism.
The mechanism
which manages the
access to the file
system data units.

FileSystem

DataUnit

Class

RAM

Socket

Class

RAM

CommsSocketObj Class
ect

RAM

ConnectionMana
gement

Class

RAM

Process

Class

RAM

FileDescriptorTab Class
le

RAM

FileDescriptor

Class

DFEvidenceTypes::RAM

GenericProcess

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::RAM

GenericNetwork

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m

DirectoryEntry

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m

Directory

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::FileSyste
m

FSMetaData

Tag
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An individual data
unit which can be
written to.
Typically a cluster
or block.
Provides API for
application to
receive and send
information.
Represents the
network stack
between the
application sockets
to the network
“wire”.
Maintains a list of
network
connections.
An individual
processes. Contains
the forensic
information of
interest.
Contains the
network handles for
the process of
interest.
Individual file
handle for a
network object.
Evidence properties
associated with a
generic process.
Evidence properties
associated with a
generic network
aware process.
Evidence properties
associated with
directory entries.
Evidence properties
associated with
directory.
Evidence properties
associated with file
system meta data.

DFEvidenceTypes::Browser

CompositeBrows
er

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::Browser

Downloads

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::Browser

History

Tag

DFEvidenceTypes::Browser

Cookies

Tag

DFTypes::FileSystem

OSData

Tag

DFTypes::FileSystem

FSStructure

Tag

Supports File
System stereotypes.

DFTypes::FileSystem

Header

Tag

Supports File
System stereotypes.

DFTypes::OS

OSStatus

Tag

Supports OS
stereotypes.

DFTypes

StatusVariables

Tag

Supports OS and
application
stereotypes.
Properties
associated with
browser status.
Properties
associated with file
system support of
browser application.
Properties
associated with db
table support of
browser application.
Properties
associated with
generic file system
for browser
application.
Properties for
generic applications.

DFTypes::Application::Brow BrowserStatus
ser

Tag

DFTypes::Application::Brow FileData
ser

Tag

DFTypes::Application::Brow RowData
ser

Tag

DFTypes::Application::FileS
ystem

AppData

Tag

DFTypes::Application::RAM AppData

Tag

DFTypes::Application

Tag

Contents
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Composite of
browser evidence
properties.
Evidence properties
associated with
browser downloads.
Evidence properties
associated with
browser visits
(history).
Evidence properties
associated with
browser cookies.
Supports File
System stereotypes.

Properties for file
contents.

DFTypes

DFTime

Tag

DFTypes

DFEnums

Tag
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Properties for time.
Supports numerous
stereotypes.
Enumerations
supporting usecases

Appendix B: Formalism and model aware languages
Basic Theory. The theoretical basis for this work is based on sets and the relationship
between sets. The theory in this section is taken directly from [71].
Sets can be mathematically defined using set comprehension. Set comprehension
takes the form of:
{x : S | P(x)}
This notation says a new set is defined by elements x which are drawn from domain S
where the elements satisfy a predicate, P(x), such that it is evaluated to be true. A
subset consist of elements drawn from anther set:
X  Y  ( e | e  X  e  Y)
A power set (e.g. P(S) is the set of all subsets as defined by:
P(S)  (e | e  S)
A product of two sets, is the set of all possible pairs (x,y) where xX and yY and
can be described by set comprehension as:
X x Y  {(x,y) | xX  y Y}

A binary relation, R, between sets X and Y is a subset of the product of two sets:
R  XxY
For a given relation, the set of 1st elements is the domain of definition and the set of
second elements is the image. Two relations can be mapped to create one relation
through relation composition. For example given s:AxB and r:BxC then s;r : A x C .
More formally:
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s;r 

(x,z)|(x,y)  s  (y,z)  r

Model Aware Languages.
The languages of interest, OAL and OCL are model aware in that they can
access the model elements. These languages refer to the elements of a class diagram.
The modeling of this work consists of navigating across class or collection class
elements to either read or modify attributes. Based on the attribute values the control
flow is identified for the next navigation.
OCL is not a programming language but a specification language. OCL can to
change the model, it can only return values. OCL is used as either a query language
or to specify invariants on classes.
Action languages, such as, OAL are able to instantiate classes, changes class
attributes, control state transitions and provide rudimentary constructs to implement
functions. The action language can provide the control flow.

Set Comprehension and Relations. A UML class is analogous to the formal concept
of set comprehension. A UML class provides a template in which objects are
instantiated, see Figure B-1. The objects are analogous to the elements being select
from a domain. The objects by definition will have all the predefined attributes of a
class.
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Figure B-1. Instance Representation of a Collection.

An UML association is analogous to the formal concept of a relation. The
association shows some type of relationship between two classes and their associated
objects. The association contains the arrow which shows how the association is being
navigated. The objects of the class in which is being navigated from contain the
objects of the domain of definition. The class which is being navigated to are the
image. The multiplicity of the association from the source class will be 1 and on the
target class will be either 1 or * (meaning 0 or more). In the example, the association
can be represented in the relation notation as:
{(x1 , y1), (x1 , y2), (x1 , y3)}
Where x1 is the object being navigated from and y1 , y2 and , y3 are the objects being
navigated to.

Navigation and selection (OCL and OAL). Figure B-2 shows and example of
navigation across classes. Starting at class X and navigating to class Y over relation s
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and then navigating from class Y to class Z utilizing relation r, the relation composition
would be represented as:
s;r 

(x1,z1)|(x1,y1)  s  (y1,z1)  r

Figure B-2. Navigation example.

In navigation it is often needed to select a particular object in a collection. For
example, see Figure B-3. In this example. The starting context is class X and the
objective is to select the object from class Z where key has a value of two. See Figure
B-4 for the OCL representation.
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Figure B-3. Navigation and selection example.

Figure B-4. OCL Navigation and Selection Example.
The equivalent OAL representation is shown in Figure B-5 and the OAL source code
representation is as follows:
select one z related by x->Y[R1]->Z[R2]

where selected.key == 2;

Figure B-5. OAL Navigation and Selection Example
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